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Given the substantial and growing scientific literature on implicit bias, the time has now 
come to confront a critical question: What, if anything, should we do about implicit bias in 
the courtroom?  The author team comprises legal academics, scientists, researchers, and even 
a sitting federal judge who seek to answer this question in accordance with behavioral 
realism.  The Article first provides a succinct scientific introduction to implicit bias, with 
some important theoretical clarifications that distinguish between explicit, implicit, 
and structural forms of bias.  Next, the Article applies the science to two trajectories of 
bias relevant to the courtroom.  One story follows a criminal defendant path; the other 
story follows a civil employment discrimination path.  This application involves not only a 
focused scientific review but also a step-by-step examination of how criminal and civil trials 
proceed.  Finally, the Article examines various concrete intervention strategies to counter 
implicit biases for key players in the justice system, such as the judge and jury.
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INTRODUCTION 
The problems of overt discrimination have received enormous attention 
from lawyers, judges, academics, and policymakers.  While explicit sexism, racism, 
and other forms of bias persist, they have become less prominent and public over 
the past century.  But explicit bias and overt discrimination are only part of the 
problem.  Also important, and likely more pervasive, are questions surrounding 
implicit bias—attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, decisionmak-
ing, and behavior, without our even realizing it. 
How prevalent and significant are these implicit, unintentional biases?  To 
answer these questions, people have historically relied on their gut instincts and 
personal experiences, which did not produce much consensus.  Over the past two 
decades, however, social cognitive psychologists have discovered novel ways to meas-
ure the existence and impact of implicit biases—without relying on mere common 
sense.  Using experimental methods in laboratory and field studies, researchers 
have provided convincing evidence that implicit biases exist, are pervasive, are 
large in magnitude, and have real-world effects.  These fascinating discoveries, 
which have migrated from the science journals into the law reviews and even popular 
discourse, are now reshaping the law’s fundamental understandings of discrim-
ination and fairness. 
Given the substantial and growing scientific literature on implicit bias, the 
time has now come to confront a critical question: What, if anything, should we do 
about implicit bias in the courtroom?  In other words, how concerned should we be 
that judges, advocates, litigants, and jurors come to the table with implicit biases 
that influence how they interpret evidence, understand facts, parse legal prin-
ciples, and make judgment calls?  In what circumstances are these risks most acute?  
Are there practical ways to reduce the effects of implicit biases?  To what extent can 
awareness of these biases mitigate their impact?  What other debiasing strategies 
might work?  In other words, in what way—if at all—should the courts respond 
to a better model of human decisionmaking that the mind sciences are providing? 
We are a team of legal academics, scientists, researchers, and a sitting federal 
judge1 who seek to answer these difficult questions in accordance with behavioral 
realism.2  Our general goal is to educate those in the legal profession who are 
  
1. Judge Mark W. Bennett, a coauthor of this article, is a United States District Court Judge in the 
Northern District of Iowa.  
2. Behavioral realism is a school of thought that asks the law to account for more accurate models of 
human cognition and behavior.  See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit 
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unfamiliar with implicit bias and its consequences.  To do so, we provide a current 
summary of the underlying science, contextualized to criminal and civil litigation 
processes that lead up to and crescendo in the courtroom.  This involves not only 
a focused scientific review but also a step-by-step examination of how criminal 
and civil trials proceed, followed by suggestions designed to address the harms.  
We seek to be useful to legal practitioners of good faith, including judges, who 
conclude that implicit bias is a problem (one among many) but do not know quite 
what to do about it.  While we aim to provide useful and realistic strategies for 
those judges already persuaded that implicit bias is a legitimate concern, we also 
hope to provoke those who know less about it, or are more skeptical of its relevance, 
to consider these issues thoughtfully. 
We are obviously not a random sample of researchers and practitioners; thus, 
we cannot claim any representative status.  That said, the author team represents a 
broad array of experience, expertise, methodology, and viewpoints.  In authoring 
this paper, the team engaged in careful deliberations across topics of both consen-
sus and dissensus.3  We did not entirely agree on how to frame questions in this 
field or how to answer them.  That said, we stand collectively behind what we have 
written.  We also believe the final work product reveals the benefits of such cross-
disciplinary and cross-professional collaboration. 
Part I provides a succinct scientific introduction to implicit bias, with some 
important theoretical clarifications.  Often the science can seem too abstract, espe-
cially to nonprofessional scientists.  As a corrective, Part II applies the science to two 
trajectories of bias relevant to the courtroom.  One story follows a criminal defendant 
path; the other story follows a civil employment discrimination path.  Part III 
  
Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 490 (2010); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, 
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 997, 997–1008 (2006).  Jon Hanson and his coauthors have advanced similar 
approaches under the names of  “critical realism,” “situationism,” and the “law and mind sciences.”  
See Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1339 n.28 (2010) 
(listing papers). 
3. This paper arose out of the second symposium of PULSE: Program on Understanding Law, 
Science, and Evidence at UCLA School of Law, on March 3–4, 2011.  We brought together leading 
scientists (including Anthony Greenwald, the inventor of the Implicit Association Test), federal 
and state judges, applied researchers, and legal academics to explore the state of the science regarding 
implicit bias research and to examine the various institutional responses to date.  The Symposium 
also raised possibilities and complications, ranging from the theoretical to practical, from the legal to 
the scientific.  After a day of public presentations, the author team met in a full-day closed session to craft 
the outlines of this paper.  Judge Michael Linfield of the Los Angeles Superior Court and Jeff 
Rachlinski, Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, participated in the symposium but could not 
join the author team.  Their absence should not be viewed as either agreement or disagreement with 
the contents of the Article. 
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examines different intervention strategies to counter the implicit biases of key 
players in the justice system, such as the judge and jury. 
I. IMPLICIT BIASES 
A. Empirical Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, cognitive and social psychologists have 
demonstrated that human beings think and act in ways that are often not rational.  
We suffer from a long litany of biases, most of them having nothing to do with 
gender, ethnicity, or race.  For example, we have an oddly stubborn tendency to 
anchor to numbers, judgments, or assessments to which we have been exposed 
and to use them as a starting point for future judgments—even if those anchors are 
objectively wrong.4  We exhibit an endowment effect, with irrational attachments 
to arbitrary initial distributions of property, rights, and grants of other entitlements.5  
We suffer from hindsight bias and believe that what turns out to be the case today 
should have been easily foreseen yesterday.6  The list of empirically revealed biases 
goes on and on.  Indeed, many legal academics have become so familiar with such 
heuristics and biases that they refer to them in their analyses as casually as they 
refer to economic concepts such as transaction costs.7  
One type of bias is driven by attitudes and stereotypes that we have about 
social categories, such as genders and races.  An attitude is an association between 
some concept (in this case a social group) and an evaluative valence, either positive 
or negative.8  A stereotype is an association between a concept (again, in this case a 
social group) and a trait.9  Although interconnected, attitudes and stereotypes 
  
4. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 667 (1999) (describing anchoring). 
5. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227 (2003). 
6. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).  
7. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature 
Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). 
8. In both common and expert usage, sometimes the word “prejudice” is used to describe a negative atti-
tude, especially when it is strong in magnitude. 
9. If the association is nearly perfect, in that almost every member of the social group has that trait, then 
we think of the trait less as a stereotype and more as a defining attribute.  Typically, when we use the 
word “stereotype,” the correlation between social group and trait is far from perfect.  See Anthony G. 
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 
949 (2006). 
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should be distinguished because a positive attitude does not foreclose negative ste-
reotypes and vice versa.  For instance, one might have a positive overall attitude 
toward African Americans and yet still associate them with weapons.  Or, one 
might have a positive stereotype of Asian Americans as mathematically able but still 
have an overall negative attitude towards them. 
The conventional wisdom has been that these social cognitions—attitudes 
and stereotypes about social groups—are explicit, in the sense that they are both 
consciously accessible through introspection and endorsed as appropriate by the 
person who possesses them.  Indeed, this understanding has shaped much of 
current antidiscrimination law.  The conventional wisdom is also that the social 
cognitions that individuals hold are relatively stable, in the sense that they operate 
in the same way over time and across different situations. 
However, recent findings in the mind sciences, especially implicit social 
cognition (ISC),10 have undermined these conventional beliefs.  As detailed 
below, attitudes and stereotypes may also be implicit, in the sense that they are not 
consciously accessible through introspection.  Accordingly, their impact on a person’s 
decisionmaking and behaviors does not depend on that person’s awareness of 
possessing these attitudes or stereotypes.  Consequently, they can function automat-
ically, including in ways that the person would not endorse as appropriate if he or she 
did have conscious awareness.   
How have mind scientists discovered such findings on matters so latent or 
implicit?  They have done so by innovating new techniques that measure implicit 
attitudes and stereotypes that by definition cannot be reliably self-reported.  Some 
of these measures involve subliminal priming and other treatments that are not 
consciously detected within an experimental setting.  Other instruments use reac-
tion time differences between two types of tasks—one that seems consistent with 
some bias, the other inconsistent—as in the Implicit Association Test (IAT).11 
  
10. Implicit social cognition (ISC) is a field of psychology that examines the mental processes that affect 
social judgments but operate without conscious awareness or conscious control.  See generally Kristin 
A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 427 (2007).  The term was first used and defined by Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin 
Banaji.  See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995). 
11. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998) (introducing the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT)).  For more information on the IAT, see Brian A. Nosek, Anthony 
G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and 
Conceptual Review, in AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 265 
(John A. Bargh ed., 2007). 
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The well-known IAT is a sorting task that measures time differences 
between schema-consistent pairings and schema-inconsistent pairings of concepts, 
as represented by words or pictures.  For example, suppose we want to test whether 
there is an implicit stereotype associating African Americans with weapons.  In a 
schema-consistent run, the participant is instructed to hit one response key when 
she sees a White face or a harmless object, and another response key when she sees 
an African American face or a weapon.  Notice that the same key is used for both 
White and harmless item; a different key is used for both African American and 
weapon.  Most people perform this task quickly. 
In a schema-inconsistent run, we reverse the pairings.  In this iteration, the 
same key is used for both White and weapon; a different key is used for both 
African American and harmless item.  Most people perform this task more slowly.12  
Of course, the order in which these tasks are presented is always systematically 
varied to ensure that the speed of people’s responses is not affected by practice.  
The time differential between these runs is defined as the implicit association effect 
and is statistically processed into standard units called an IAT D score.13 
Through the IAT, social psychologists from hundreds of laboratories have 
collected enormous amounts of data14 on reaction-time measures of “implicit 
biases,” a term we use to denote implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes.  According 
to these measures, implicit bias is pervasive (widely held),15 large in magnitude (as 
compared to standardized measures of explicit bias),16 dissociated from explicit 
biases (which suggests that explicit biases and implicit biases, while related, are 
  
12. See Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. 
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 17 (2007). 
13. This D score, which ranges from –2.0 to 2.0, is a standardized score, which is computed by 
dividing the IAT effect as measured in milliseconds by the standard deviations of the participants’ 
latencies pooled across schema-consistent and -inconsistent conditions.  See, e.g., Anthony Greenwald 
et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003). If an individual’s IAT D score is divided by its 
standard deviation of the population that has taken the test, the result is interpretable as the 
commonly used effect size measure, Cohen’s d. 
14. The most prominent dataset is collected at PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://projectimplicit.org (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2012) (providing free online tests of automatic associations).  For a broad analysis of this 
dataset, see Nosek et al., supra note 12. 
15. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 10, at 437. 
16. Cohen’s d is a standardized unit of the size of a statistical effect.  By convention, social scientists mark 
0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 as small, medium, and large effect sizes.  The IAT effect, as measured in Cohen’s d, 
on various stereotypes and attitudes range from medium to large.  See Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 
474 n.35 (discussing data from Project Implicit).  Moreover, the effect sizes of implicit bias against 
social groups are frequently larger than the effect sizes produced by explicit bias measures.  See id. at 
474–75 tbl.1. 
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separate mental constructs),17 and predicts certain kinds of real-world behavior.18  
What policymakers are now keen to understand are the size and scope of these 
behavioral effects and how to counter them—by altering the implicit biases themselves 
and by implementing strategies to attenuate their effects. 
Useful and current summaries of the scientific evidence can be found in both 
the legal and psychological literatures.  For example, in the last volume of this 
law review, Jerry Kang and Kristin Lane provided a summary of the evidence 
demonstrating that we are not perceptually, cognitively, or behaviorally colorblind.19  
Justin Levinson and Danielle Young have summarized studies focusing on jury 
decisionmaking.20  In the psychology journals, John Jost and colleagues responded 
to sharp criticism21 that the IAT studies lacked real-world consequences by 
providing a qualitative review of the literature, including ten studies that no 
manager should ignore.22  Further, they explained how the findings are entirely 
consistent with the major tenets of twentieth century social cognitive psychology.23  
In a quantitative review, Anthony Greenwald conducted a meta-analysis of IAT 
studies—which synthesizes all the relevant scientific findings—and found that 
implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT predicted certain types of behavior, 
such as anti-Black discrimination or intergroup discrimination, substantially better 
than explicit bias measures.24 
Instead of duplicating these summaries, we offer research findings that are 
specific to implicit bias leading up to and in the courtroom.  To do so, we chart 
  
17. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Brian A. Nosek, Attitudinal Dissociation: What Does It Mean?, in 
ATTITUDES: INSIGHTS FROM THE NEW IMPLICIT MEASURES 65 (Richard E. Petty, Russell E. 
Fazio & Pablo Briñol eds., 2008). 
18. See Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 481–90 (discussing evidence of biased behavior in perceiving smiles, 
responding to threats, screening resumes, and body language). 
19. See Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 473–90; see also David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia 
L. Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1389 (2008). 
20. See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and 
Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 319–26 (2010). 
21. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1108–10 (2006). 
22. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Prejudice Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation 
of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager 
Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 41 (2009). 
23. See id. 
24. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-
Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 19–20 (2009).  Implicit 
attitude scores predicted behavior in this domain at an average correlation of r=0.24, whereas explicit atti-
tude scores had correlations at an average of r=0.12.  See id. at 24 tbl.3. 
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out two case trajectories—one criminal, the other civil.  That synthesis appears in 
Part II. 
B. Theoretical Clarification 
But before we leave our introduction to implicit bias, we seek to make some 
theoretical clarifications on the relationships between explicit biases, implicit biases, 
and structural processes that are all involved in producing unfairness in the 
courtroom.  We do so because the legal literature has flagged this as an important 
issue.25  In addition, a competent diagnosis of unfairness in the courtroom requires 
disentangling these various processes.  For instance, if the end is to counter discrim-
ination caused by, say, explicit bias, it may be ineffective to adopt means that are 
better tailored to respond to implicit bias, and vice versa. 
We start by clarifying terms.  To repeat, explicit biases are attitudes and stere-
otypes that are consciously accessible through introspection and endorsed as appro-
priate.  If no social norm against these biases exists within a given context, a person 
will freely broadcast them to others.  But if such a norm exists, then explicit 
biases can be concealed to manage the impressions that others have of us.  By 
contrast, implicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously acces-
sible through introspection.  If we find out that we have them, we may indeed 
reject them as inappropriate. 
Above, we used the labels “explicit” and “implicit” as adjectives to describe 
mental constructs—attitudes and stereotypes.  Readers should recognize that these 
adjectives can also apply to research procedures or instruments.  An explicit 
instrument asks the respondent for a direct self-report with no attempt by 
researchers to disguise the mental construct that they are measuring.  An example 
is a straightforward survey question.  No instrument perfectly measures a mental 
construct.  In fact, one can often easily conceal one’s explicit bias as measured 
through an explicit instrument.  In this way, an explicit instrument can poorly meas-
ure an explicit bias, as the test subject may choose not to be candid about the 
beliefs or attitudes at issue. 
By contrast, an implicit instrument does not depend on the respondent’s 
conscious knowledge of the mental constructs that the researcher is inferring from 
the measure.  An example is a reaction-time measure, such as the IAT.  This does 
not necessarily mean that the respondent is unaware that the IAT is measuring bias.  
  
25. See generally Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009); Stephen M. Rich, Against 
Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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It also does not mean that the respondent is actually unaware that he or she has 
implicit biases, for example because she has taken an IAT before or is generally 
aware of the research literature.  To repeat, no instrument perfectly measures any 
mental construct, and this remains true for implicit instruments.  One might, for 
instance, try to conceal implicit bias measured through an implicit instrument, 
but such faking is often much harder than faking explicit bias measured by an 
explicit instrument.26 
Finally, besides explicit and implicit biases, another set of processes that 
produce unfairness in the courtroom can be called “structural.”  Other names 
include “institutional” or “societal.”  These processes can lock in past inequalities, 
reproduce them, and indeed exacerbate them even without formally treating 
persons worse simply because of attitudes and stereotypes about the groups to 
which they belong.27  In other words, structural bias can produce unfairness even 
though no single individual is being treated worse right now because of his or her 
membership in a particular social category. 
Because thinking through biases with respect to human beings evokes so much 
potential emotional resistance, sometimes it is easier to apply them to something 
less fraught than gender, race, religion, and the like.  So, consider a vegetarian’s 
biases against meat.  He has a negative attitude (that is, prejudice) toward meat.  
He also believes that eating meat is bad for his health (a stereotype).  He is aware of 
this attitude and stereotype.  He also endorses them as appropriate.  That is, he 
feels that it is okay to have a negative reaction to meat.  He also believes it accurate 
enough to believe that meat is generally bad for human health and that there is no 
reason to avoid behaving in accordance with this belief.  These are explicit biases. 
Now, if this vegetarian is running for political office and campaigning in a 
region famous for barbecue, he will probably keep his views to himself.  He could, 
for example, avoid showing disgust on his face or making critical comments when 
a plate of ribs is placed in front of him.  Indeed, he might even take a bite and 
compliment the cook.  This is an example of concealed bias (explicit bias that is 
hidden to manage impressions). 
  
26. See, e.g., Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), 66 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. Q. 83, 95–96 (2003). 
27. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 1089, 1117–22 (2002) (applying lock-in theory to explain the inequalities between Blacks 
and Whites in education, housing, and employment); john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building 
Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 795–800 (2008) (adopting a systems 
approach to describe structured racialization); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In 
Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 743–48 (2000) (describing lock-in theory, drawing on 
antitrust law and concepts). 
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Consider, by contrast, another vegetarian who has recently converted for 
environmental reasons.  She proclaims explicitly and sincerely a negative attitude 
toward meat.  But it may well be that she has an implicit attitude that is still slightly 
positive.  Suppose that she grew up enjoying weekend barbecues with family and 
friends, or still likes the taste of steak, or first learned to cook by making roasts.  
Whatever the sources and causes, she may still have an implicitly positive attitude 
toward meat.  This is an implicit bias. 
Finally, consider some eating decision that she has to make at a local strip 
mall.  She can buy a salad for $10 or a cheeseburger for $3.  Unfortunately, she has 
only $5 to spare and must eat.  Neither explicit nor implicit biases much explain 
her decision to buy the cheeseburger.  She simply lacks the funds to buy the salad, 
and her need to eat trumps her desire to avoid meat.  The decision was not 
driven principally by an attitude or stereotype, explicit or implicit, but by the price.  
But what if a careful historical, economic, political, and cultural analysis revealed 
multifarious subsidies, political kickbacks, historical contingencies, and econo-
mies of scale that accumulated in mutually reinforcing ways to price the salad much 
higher than the cheeseburger?  These various forces could make it more instru-
mentally rational for consumers to eat cheeseburgers.  This would be an example 
of structural bias in favor of meat. 
We disentangle these various mechanisms—explicit attitudes and stereotypes 
(sometimes concealed, sometimes revealed), implicit attitudes and stereotypes, and 
structural forces—because they pose different threats to fairness everywhere, 
including the courtroom.  For instance, the threat to fairness posed by jurors with 
explicit negative attitudes toward Muslims but who conceal their prejudice to 
stay on the jury is quite different from the threat posed by jurors who perceive 
themselves as nonbiased but who nevertheless hold negative implicit stereotypes 
about Muslims.  Where appropriate, we explain how certain studies provide evi-
dence of one type of bias or the other.  In addition, we want to underscore that 
these various mechanisms—explicit bias, implicit bias, and structural forces—are 
not mutually exclusive.28  To the contrary, they may often be mutually reinforc-
ing.  In focusing on implicit bias in the courtroom, we do not mean to suggest 
  
28. See, e.g., GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 23–30 (2002) (discussing self-
reinforcing stereotypes); john powell & Rachel Godsil, Implicit Bias Insights as Preconditions to Structural 
Change, POVERTY & RACE, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 3, 6 (explaining why “implicit bias insights are 
crucial to addressing the substantive inequalities that result from structural racialization”). 
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that implicit bias is the only or most important problem, or that explicit bias 
(revealed or concealed) and structural forces are unimportant or insignificant.29 
II. TWO TRAJECTORIES 
A. The Criminal Path 
Consider, for example, some of the crucial milestones in a criminal case 
flowing to trial.  First, on the basis of a crime report, the police investigate particular 
neighborhoods and persons of interest and ultimately arrest a suspect.  Second, 
the prosecutor decides to charge the suspect with a particular crime.  Third, the 
judge makes decisions about bail and pretrial detention.  Fourth, the defendant 
decides whether to accept a plea bargain after consulting his defense attorney, 
often a public defender or court-appointed private counsel.  Fifth, if the case goes 
to trial, the judge manages the proceedings while the jury decides whether the 
defendant is guilty.  Finally, if convicted, the defendant must be sentenced.  At 
each of these stages,30 implicit biases can have an important impact.  To maintain 
a manageable scope of analysis, we focus on the police encounter, charge and plea 
bargain, trial, and sentencing. 
1. Police Encounter 
Blackness and criminality.  If we implicitly associate certain groups, such as 
African Americans, with certain attributes, such as criminality, then it should not 
be surprising that police may behave in a manner consistent with those implicit 
stereotypes.  In other words, biases could shape whether an officer decides to stop 
an individual for questioning in the first place, elects to interrogate briefly or at 
length, decides to frisk the individual, and concludes the encounter with an arrest 
versus a warning.31  These biases could contribute to the substantial racial dispar-
ities that have been widely documented in policing.32 
  
29. See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback From the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139, 1146–48 
(2010) (specifically rejecting complaint that implicit bias analysis must engage in reductionism). 
30. The number of stages is somewhat arbitrary.  We could have listed more stages in a finer-grained 
timeline or vice versa. 
31. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 976–77 (2002).  
32. See, e.g., Dianna Hunt, Ticket to Trouble/Wheels of Injustice/Certain Areas Are Ticket Traps for 
Minorities, HOUS. CHRON., May 14, 1995, at A1 (analyzing sixteen million Texas driving records 
and finding that minority drivers straying into White neighborhoods in Texas’s major urban areas 
were twice as likely as Whites to get traffic violations); Sam Vincent Meddis & Mike Snider, Drug 
War ‘Focused’ on Blacks, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1990, at 1A (reporting findings from a 1989 USA 
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Since the mid–twentieth century, social scientists have uncovered empir-
ical evidence of negative attitudes toward African Americans as well as stereotypes 
about their being violent and criminal.33  Those biases persist today, as measured 
by not only explicit but also implicit instruments.34 
For example, Jennifer Eberhardt, Philip Goff, Valerie Purdie, and Paul 
Davies have demonstrated a bidirectional activation between Blackness and crimi-
nality.35  When participants are subliminally primed36 with a Black male face (as 
opposed to a White male face, or no prime at all), they are quicker to distinguish 
the faint outline of a weapon that slowly emerges out of visual static.37  In other 
words, by implicitly thinking Black, they more quickly saw a weapon. 
Interestingly, the phenomenon also happens in reverse.  When subliminally 
primed with drawings of weapons, participants visually attended to Black male 
faces more than comparable White male faces.38  Researchers found this result not 
only in a student population, which is often criticized for being unrepresentative 
of the real world, but also among police officers.39  The research suggests both that 
  
Today study that 41 percent of those arrested on drug charges were African American whereas 15 
percent of the drug-using population is African American); Billy Porterfield, Data Raise Question: 
Is the Drug War Racist?, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 4, 1994, at A1 (citing study showing that 
African Americans were over seven times more likely than Whites to be arrested on drug charges in 
Travis County in 1993). 
33. See generally Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The 
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1995). 
34. In a seminal paper, Patricia Devine demonstrated that being subliminally primed with stere-
otypically “Black” words prompted participants to evaluate ambiguous behavior as more hostile.  See 
Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989).  The priming words included “Negroes, lazy, Blacks, 
blues, rhythm, Africa, stereotype, ghetto, welfare, basketball, unemployed, and plantation.”  Id. at 
10.  Those who received a heavy dose of priming (80 percent stereotypical words) interpreted a person’s 
actions as more hostile than those who received a milder dose (20 percent).  Id. at 11–12; see also John 
A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation 
on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238–39 (1996). 
35. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004). 
36. The photograph flashed for only thirty milliseconds.  Id. at 879. 
37. See id. at 879–80.  There was a 21 percent drop in perceptual threshold between White face primes 
and Black face primes.  This was measured by counting the number of frames (out of a total of 41) 
that were required before the participant recognized the outlines of the weapon in both conditions.  
There was a 8.8 frame difference between the two conditions.  Id. at 881. 
38. Visual attendance was measured via a dot-probe paradigm, which requires participants to indicate on 
which side of the screen a dot flashes.  The idea is that if a respondent is already looking at one 
face (for example, the Black photograph), he or she will see a dot flash near the Black photograph 
faster.  See id. at 881 (describing dot-paradigm as the gold standard in visual attention measures).  
39. See id. at 885–87 (describing methods, procedures, and results of Study 4, which involved sixty-one 
police officers who were 76 percent White, 86 percent male, and who had an average age of forty-two).  
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the idea of Blackness triggers weapons and makes them easier to see, and, simul-
taneously, that the idea of weapons triggers visual attention to Blackness.  How 
these findings translate into actual police work is, of course, still speculative.  At a 
minimum, however, they suggest the possibility that officers have an implicit 
association between Blackness and weapons that could affect both their hunches 
and their visual attention. 
Even if this is the case, one might respond that extra visual attention by 
the police is not too burdensome.  But who among us enjoys driving with a police 
cruiser on his or her tail?40  Moreover, the increased visual attention did not 
promote accuracy; instead, it warped the officers’ perceptual memories.  The sublim-
inal prime of weapons led police officers not only to look more at Black faces but 
also to remember them in a biased way, as having more stereotypically African 
American features.  Thus, they “were more likely to falsely identify a face that was 
more stereotypically Black than the target when they were primed with crime 
than when they were not primed.”41 
We underscore a point that is so obvious that it is easy to miss.  The primes 
in these studies were all flashed subliminally.  Thus, the behavioral differences in 
visually attending to Black faces and in remembering them more stereotypically 
were all triggered implicitly, without the participants’ conscious awareness. 
Shooter bias.  The implicit association between Blackness and weapons has also 
been found through other instruments, including other priming tasks42 and the IAT.  
One of the tests available on Project Implicit specifically examines the implicit 
stereotype between African Americans (as compared to European Americans) 
and weapons (as compared to harmless items).  That association has been found 
to be strong, widespread, and dissociated from explicit self-reports.43 
Skeptics can reasonably ask why we should care about minor differentials 
between schema-consistent and -inconsistent pairings that are often no more 
than a half second.  But it is worth remembering that a half second may be all 
  
In this study, the crime primes were not pictures but words: “violent, crime, stop, investigate, arrest, 
report, shoot, capture, chase, and apprehend.”  Id. at 886. 
40. See Carbado, supra note 31, at 966–67 (describing existential burdens of heightened police surveillance). 
41. Eberhardt et al., supra note 35, at 887. 
42. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in 
Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185–86 (2001).  The 
study deployed a priming paradigm, in which a photograph of a Black or White face was flashed to partic-
ipants for two hundred milliseconds.  Immediately thereafter, participants were shown pictures of guns 
or tools.  Id. at 184.  When primed by the Black face, participants identified guns faster.  Id. at 185. 
43. For N=85,742 participants, the average IAT D score was 0.37; Cohen’s d=1.00. By contrast, the self-
reported association (that is, the explicit stereotype measure) was Cohen’s d=0.31.  See Nosek et al., supra 
note 12, at 11 tbl.2. 
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the time a police officer has to decide whether to shoot.  In the policing context, 
that half second might mean the difference between life and death.  
Joshua Correll developed a shooter paradigm video game in which partic-
ipants are confronted with photographs of individuals (targets) holding an object, 
superimposed on various city landscapes.44  If the object is a weapon, the 
participant is instructed to press a key to shoot.  If the object is harmless (for 
example, a wallet), the participant must press a different key to holster the weapon.  
Correll found that participants were quicker to shoot when the target was Black 
as compared to White.45  Also, under time pressure, participants made more 
mistakes (false alarms) and shot more unarmed Black targets than unarmed 
White targets, and failed to shoot more armed White targets (misses) than armed Black 
targets.46  Interestingly, the shooter bias effect was not correlated with measures 
of explicit personal stereotypes.47  Correll also found comparable amounts of 
shooter bias in African American participants.48  This suggests that negative attitudes 
toward African Americans are not what drive the phenomenon.49   
The shooter bias experiments have also been run on actual police officers, 
with mixed results.  In one study, police officers showed the same bias in favor of 
shooting unarmed Blacks more often than unarmed Whites that student and 
civilian populations demonstrated.50  In another study, however, although police 
officers showed a similar speed bias, they did not show any racial bias in the 
  
44. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially 
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315–17 (2002) (describing 
the procedure). 
45. Id. at 1317. 
46. Id. at 1319.  For qualifications about how the researchers discarded outliers, see Jerry Kang, Trojan 
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493 n.16 (2005).  Subsequent studies have confirmed 
Correll’s general findings.  See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects 
of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399 (finding 
similar results). 
47. Correll et al., supra note 44, at 1323.  The scales used were the Modern Racism Scale, the 
Discrimination and Diversity Scale, the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Responding Scale, and some 
questions from the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale and the Personal Need for Structure Scale for 
good measure.  Id. at 1321.  These are survey instruments that are commonly used in social 
psychological research. Shooter bias was, however, correlated with measures of societal stere-
otypes—the stereotypes that other people supposedly held.  Id. at 1323. 
48. See id. at 1324. 
49. On explicit attitude instruments, African Americans show on average substantial in-group 
preference (over Whites).  On implicit attitude instruments, such as the IAT, African Americans bell 
curve around zero, which means that they show no preference on average.  See Brian A. Nosek, 
Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From 
a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY RES. & PRACTICE 101, l05–06 (2002). 
50. See E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ Responses to 
Criminal Subjects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 181 (2005). 
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most important criterion of accuracy.  In other words, there was no higher error 
rate of shooting unarmed Blacks as compared to Whites.51 
Finally, in a study that directly linked implicit stereotypes (with weapons) as 
measured by the IAT and shooter bias, Jack Glaser and Eric Knowles found 
that “[i]ndividuals possessing a relatively strong stereotype linking Blacks and weap-
ons [one standard deviation above the mean IAT] clearly show the Shooter 
Bias.”52  By contrast, recall that Correll found no such correlation with explicit 
stereotypes.  These findings are consistent with the implicit stereotype story.  Of 
course, it may also be true that participants were simply downplaying or concealing 
their explicit bias, which could help explain why no correlation was found. 
In sum, we have evidence that suggests that implicit biases could well influ-
ence various aspects of policing.  A fairly broad set of research findings shows that 
implicit biases (as measured by implicit instruments) alter and affect numerous 
behaviors that police regularly engage in—visual surveillance, recall, and even 
armed response.53  It should go without saying that explicit biases, which often 
undergird unspoken policies of racial profiling, also play an enormous role in the 
differential policing of people of color.  It also should go without saying that 
various structural forces that produce racially segregated, predominantly minority 
neighborhoods that have higher poverty and crime rates also have a huge impact on 
racialized policing.  Nevertheless, we repeat these points so that readers internalize 
the idea that implicit, explicit, and structural processes should not be deemed 
mutually exclusive.  
2. Charge and Plea Bargain 
Journalistic investigations have uncovered some statistical evidence that 
racial minorities are treated worse than Whites in prosecutors’ charging decisions.54  
  
51. See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 
92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1010–13, 1016–17 (2007) (describing the results 
from two studies). 
52. Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 164, 169 (2008). 
53. For discussions in the law reviews, with some treatment of implicit biases, see Alex Geisinger, 
Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L. REV. 657, 667–73 
(2007) (providing a cognitive model based on automatic categorization in accordance with behav-
ioral realism). 
54. For example, in San Jose, a newspaper investigation concluded that out of the almost seven hundred 
thousand criminal cases reported, “at virtually every stage of pre-trial negotiation, whites are more 
successful than non-whites.”  Ruth Marcus, Racial Bias Widely Seen in Criminal Justice System; 
Research Often Supports Black Perceptions, WASH. POST, May 12, 1992, at A4.  San Francisco 
Public Defender Jeff Brown commented on racial stereotyping: “It’s a feeling, ‘You’ve got a nice 
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Of course, there might be some legitimate reason for those disparities if, for 
example, minorities and Whites are not similarly situated on average.  One way 
to examine whether the merits drive the disparate results is to control for everything 
except some irrelevant attribute, such as race.  In several studies, researchers used 
regression analyses to conclude that race was indeed independently correlated with 
the severity of the prosecutor’s charge. 
For example, in a 1985 study of charging decisions by prosecutors in Los 
Angeles, researchers found prosecutors more likely to press charges against 
Black than White defendants, and determined that these charging disparities 
could not be accounted for by race-neutral factors, such as prior record, seri-
ousness of charge, or use of a weapon.55  Two studies also in the late 1980s, one in 
Florida and the other in Indiana, found charging discrepancies based on the race 
of the victim.56  At the federal level, a U.S. Sentencing Commission report found 
that prosecutors were more apt to offer White defendants generous plea bargains 
with sentences below the prescribed guidelines than to offer them to Black or 
Latino defendants.57 
While these studies are suggestive, other studies find no disparate treatment.58  
Moreover, this kind of statistical evidence does not definitively tell us that biases 
  
person screwing up,’ as opposed to feeling that ‘this minority is on a track and eventually they’re 
going to end up in state prison.’”  Christopher H. Schmitt, Why Plea Bargains Reflect Bias, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1A; see also Christopher Johns, The Color of Justice: More and 
More, Research Shows Minorities Aren’t Treated the Same as Anglos by the Criminal Justice System, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, July 4, 1993, at C1 (citing several reports showing disparate treatment of Blacks in the 
criminal justice system). 
55. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587, 615–19 (1985). 
56. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1493 (2000) (citing Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public 
Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBS. 439, 441–47 (1979)); 
Radelet & Pierce, supra note 55, at 615–19. 
57. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 n.41 (2000), available at http://www.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/ 
reports/justice.pdf (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995)); see also Kevin McNally, Race and Federal 
Death Penalty: A Nonexistent Problem Gets Worse, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1615 (2004) (compiling studies 
on the death penalty). 
58. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Ball, Is It a Prosecutor’s World? Determinants of Count Bargaining Decisions, 22 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 241 (2006) (finding no correlation between race and the willingness of 
prosecutors to reduce charges in order to obtain guilty pleas but acknowledging that the study did not 
include evaluation of the original arrest report); Cyndy Caravelis et al., Race, Ethnicity, Threat, and 
the Designation of Career Offenders, 2011 JUST. Q. 1 (showing that in some counties, Blacks and Latinos 
are more likely than Whites with similar profiles to be prosecuted as career offenders, but in other 
counties with different demographics, Blacks and Latinos have a lesser likelihood of such prosecution). 
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generally or implicit biases specifically produce discriminatory charging decisions 
or plea offers by prosecutors, or a discriminatory willingness to accept worse plea 
bargains on the part of defense attorneys.  The best way to get evidence on such 
hypotheses would be to measure the implicit biases of prosecutors and defense 
attorneys and investigate the extent to which those biases predict different 
treatment of cases otherwise identical on the merits. 
Unfortunately, we have very little data on this front.  Indeed, we have no 
studies, as of yet, that look at prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ implicit biases 
and attempt to correlate them with those individuals’ charging practices or plea 
bargains.  Nor do we know as much as we would like about their implicit biases 
more generally.  But on that score, we do know something.  Start with defense 
attorneys.  One might think that defense attorneys, repeatedly put into the role of 
interacting with what is often a disproportionately minority clientele, and often ideo-
logically committed to racial equality,59 might have materially different implicit 
biases from the general population.  But Ted Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson 
found evidence to the contrary: Even capital punishment defense attorneys show neg-
ative implicit attitudes toward African Americans.60  Their implicit attitudes toward 
Blacks roughly mirrored those of the population at large. 
What about prosecutors?  To our knowledge, no one has measured specifi-
cally the implicit biases held by prosecutors.61  That said, there is no reason to 
  
59. See Gordon B. Moskowitz, Amanda R. Salomon & Constance M. Taylor, Preconsciously Controlling 
Stereotyping: Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 SOC. 
COGNITION 151, 155–56 (2000) (showing that “chronic egalitarians” who are personally committed 
to removing bias in themselves do not exhibit implicit attitudinal preference for Whites over Blacks). 
60. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1545–55 (2004).  The researchers used a paper-pencil IAT that measured 
attitudes about Blacks and Whites.  Id. at 1543–45.  The defense attorneys displayed biases that were 
comparable to the rest of the population.  Id. at 1553.  The findings by Moskowitz and colleagues, 
supra note 59, sit in some tension with findings by Eisenberg and Johnson. It is possible that defense 
attorneys are not chronic egalitarians and/or that the specific practice of criminal defense work 
exacerbates implicit biases even among chronic egalitarians. 
61. In some contexts, prosecutors have resisted revealing information potentially related to their 
biases.  For example, in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss the indictment for selective prosecution, arguing that the U.S. Attorney prosecuted virtually 
all African Americans charged with crack offenses in federal court but left all White crack defendants 
to be prosecuted in state court, resulting in much longer sentences for identical offenses.  Id. at 460–61.  
The claim foundered when the U.S. Attorney’s Office resisted the defendants’ discovery motion 
concerning criteria for prosecutorial decisions and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office’s refusal to provide discovery.  Id. at 459–62.  The Court held that, prior to being entitled 
even to discovery, defendants claiming selective prosecution cases based on race must produce credible 
evidence that “similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.”  Id. at 465.  
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presume attorney exceptionalism in terms of implicit biases.62  And if defense 
attorneys, who might be expected to be less biased than the population, show typ-
ical amounts of implicit bias, it would seem odd to presume that prosecutors would 
somehow be immune.  If this is right, there is plenty of reason to be concerned 
about how these biases might play out in practice.   
As we explain in greater detail below, the conditions under which implicit 
biases translate most readily into discriminatory behavior are when people have 
wide discretion in making quick decisions with little accountability.  Prosecutors 
function in just such environments.63  They exercise tremendous discretion to 
decide whether, against whom, and at what level of severity to charge a particu-
lar crime; they also influence the terms and likelihood of a plea bargain and the 
length of the prison sentence—all with little judicial oversight.  Other psycholog-
ical theories—such as confirmation bias, social judgeability theory, and shifting 
standards, which we discuss below64—reinforce our hypothesis that prosecutorial 
decisionmaking indeed risks being influenced by implicit bias. 
3. Trial 
a. Jury 
If the case goes to the jury, what do we know about how implicit biases 
might influence the factfinder’s decisionmaking?  There is a long line of research 
on racial discrimination by jurors, mostly in the criminal context.  Notwithstand-
ing some mixed findings, the general research consensus is that jurors of one 
race tend to show bias against defendants who belong to another race (“racial 
outgroups”).  For example, White jurors will treat Black defendants worse than 
they treat comparable White defendants.  The best and most recent meta-analysis 
of laboratory juror studies was performed by Tara Mitchell and colleagues, who 
found that the fact that a juror was of a different race than the defendant influenced 
  
62. Several of the authors have conducted training sessions with attorneys in which we run the IAT in 
the days leading up to the training.  The results of these IATs have shown that attorneys harbor biases 
that are similar to those harbored by the rest of the population.  One recent study of a related population, 
law students, confirmed that they too harbor implicit gender biases.  See Justin D. Levinson & 
Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 1, 28–31 (2010). 
63. See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 795 (2012) (undertaking a step-by-step consideration 
of how prosecutorial discretion may be fraught with implicit bias). 
64. See infra Part II.B. 
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both verdicts and sentencing.65  The magnitude of the effect sizes were measured 
conservatively66 and found to be small (Cohen’s d=0.092 for verdicts, d=0.185 for 
sentencing).67 
But effects deemed “small” by social scientists may nonetheless have huge 
consequences for the individual, the social category he belongs to, and the entire soci-
ety.  For example, if White juries rendered guilty verdicts in exactly 80 percent of 
their decisions,68 then an effect size of Cohen’s d=0.095 would mean that the rate 
of conviction for Black defendants will be 83.8 percent, compared to 76.2 percent 
for White defendants.  Put another way, in one hundred otherwise identical 
trials, eight more Black than White defendants would be found guilty.69 
One might assume that juror bias against racial outgroups would be greater 
when the case is somehow racially charged or inflamed, as opposed to those 
instances when race does not explicitly figure in the crime.  Interestingly, many 
experiments have demonstrated just the opposite.70  Sam Sommers and Phoebe 
Ellsworth explain the counterintuitive phenomenon in this way: When the case is 
racially charged, jurors—who want to be fair—respond by being more careful 
and thoughtful about race and their own assumptions and thus do not show bias 
in their deliberations and outcomes.  By contrast, when the case is not racially 
charged, even though there is a Black defendant and a White victim, jurors are 
not especially vigilant about the possibility of racial bias influencing their 
  
65. Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 627–28 (2005).  The meta-analysis processed 
thirty-four juror verdict studies (with 7397 participants) and sixteen juror sentencing studies (with 
3141 participants).  Id. at 625.  All studies involved experimental manipulation of the defendant’s 
race.  Multirace participant samples were separated out in order to maintain the study’s definition of 
racial bias as a juror’s differential treatment of a defendant who belonged to a racial outgroup.  See id. 
66. Studies that reported nonsignificant results (p>0.05) for which effect sizes could not be calculated 
were given effect sizes of 0.00.  Id. 
67. Id. at 629. 
68. See TRACY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 221152, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 
2004, at 1, 3 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (“Seventy-nine 
percent of trials resulted in a guilty verdict or judgment, including 82% of bench trials and 76% of 
jury trials.”); see also THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES, 2006, at 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf 
(reporting the “typical” outcome as three out of four trials resulting in convictions).   
69. This translation between effect size d values and outcomes was described by Robert Rosenthal & 
Donald B. Rubin, A Simple, General Purpose Display of Magnitude of Experimental Effect, 74 J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 166 (1982). 
70. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making: 
Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599 (2009). 
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decisionmaking.  These findings are more consistent with an implicit bias than a 
concealed explicit bias explanation.71 
So far, we know that race effects have been demonstrated in juror studies 
(sometimes in counterintuitive ways), but admittedly little is known about “the 
precise psychological processes through which the influence of race occurs in the 
legal context.”72  Our default assumption is juror unexceptionalism—given that 
implicit biases generally influence decisionmaking, there is no reason to presume 
that citizens become immune to the effects of these biases when they serve in the 
role of jurors.  Leading scholars from the juror bias field have expressly raised the pos-
sibility that the psychological mechanisms might be “unintentional and even 
non-conscious processes.”73 
Some recent juror studies by Justin Levinson and Danielle Young have 
tried to disentangle the psychological mechanisms of juror bias by using the IAT 
and other methods.  In one mock juror study, Levinson and Young had partic-
ipants view five photographs of a crime scene, including a surveillance camera 
photo that featured a masked gunman whose hand and forearm were visible.  For 
half the participants, that arm was dark skinned; for the other half, that arm was 
lighter skinned.74  The participants were then provided twenty different pieces of 
trial evidence.  The evidence was designed to produce an ambiguous case regarding 
whether the defendant was indeed the culprit.  Participants were asked to rate 
how much the presented evidence tended to indicate the defendant’s guilt or inno-
cence and to decide whether the defendant was guilty or not, using both a scale of 
guilty or not guilty and a likelihood scale of zero to one hundred.75 
The study found that the subtle manipulation of the skin color altered how 
jurors evaluated the evidence presented and also how they answered the crucial 
question “How guilty is the defendant?”  The guilt mean score was M=66.97 for 
  
71. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice 
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 255 
(2001); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and 
Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000).  That said, 
one could still hold to an explicit bias story in the following way: The juror has a negative attitude or 
stereotype that he is consciously aware of and endorses.  But he knows it is not socially acceptable 
so he conceals it.  When a case is racially charged, racial bias is more salient, so other jurors will be on 
the lookout for bias.  Accordingly, the juror conceals it even more, all the way up to making sure that 
his behavior is completely race neutral.  This explicit bias story is not mutually exclusive with the 
implicit bias story we are telling. 
72. Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision-Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 171, 172 (2007). 
73. Id. at 175. 
74. Levinson & Young, supra note 20, at 332–33 (describing experimental procedures).  
75. Id. at 334. 
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dark skin and M=56.37 for light skin, with 100 being “definitely guilty.”76  Measures 
of explicit bias, including the Modern Racism Scale and feeling thermometers, 
showed no statistically significant correlation with the participants’ weighing of the 
evidence or assessment of guilt.77  More revealing, participants were asked to recall 
the race of the masked robber (which was a proxy for the light or dark skin), but 
many could not recall it.78  Moreover, their recollections did not correlate with their 
judgments of guilt.79  Taken together, these findings suggest that implicit bias—not 
explicit, concealed bias, or even any degree of conscious focus on race—was influ-
encing how jurors assessed the evidence in the case. 
In fact, there is even clearer evidence that implicit bias was at work.  
Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Young also constructed a new IAT, the Guilty–Not 
Guilty IAT, to test implicit stereotypes of African Americans as guilty (not innocent).80  
They gave the participants this new IAT and the general race attitude IAT.  They 
found that participants showed an implicit negative attitude toward Blacks as well 
as a small implicit stereotype between Black and guilty.81  More important than the 
bias itself is whether it predicts judgment.  On the one hand, regression analysis 
demonstrated that a measure of evidence evaluation was a function of both the 
implicit attitude and the implicit stereotype.82  On the other hand, the IAT scores 
did not predict what is arguably more important: guilty verdicts or judgments of 
guilt on a more granular scale (from zero to one hundred).83  In sum, a subtle change 
  
76. See id. at 337 (confirming that the difference was statistically significant, F=4.40, p=0.034, d=0.52). 
77. Id. at 338. 
78. This finding built upon Levinson’s previous experimental study of implicit memory bias in legal 
decisionmaking.  See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398–406 (2007) (finding that study participants misremembered 
trial-relevant facts in racially biased ways). 
79. Levinson & Young, supra note 20, at 338. 
80. Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Bias: The Guilty–Not Guilty 
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010). 
81. Id. at 204.  For the attitude IAT, D=0.21 (p<0.01).  Id. at 204 n.87.  For the Guilty–Not Guilty IAT, 
D=0.18 (p<0.01).  Id. at 204 n.83. 
82. Participants rated each of the twenty pieces of information (evidence) in terms of its probity 
regarding guilt or innocence on a 1–7 scale.  This produced a total “evidence evaluation” score that could 
range between 20 (least amount of evidence of guilt) to 140 (greatest).  Id. at 202 n.70 (citation 
omitted).  The greater the Black = guilty stereotype or the greater the negative attitude toward Blacks, the 
higher the guilty evidence evaluation.  The ultimate regression equation was: Evidence = 88.58 + 5.74 x 
BW + 6.61 x GI + 9.11 x AI + e (where BW stands for Black or White suspect; GI stands for guilty 
stereotype IAT score; AI stands for race attitude IAT score; e stands for error).  Id. at 206.  In 
normalized units, the implicit stereotype β=0.25 (p<0.05); the implicit attitude β=0.34 (p<0.01); 
adjusted R2=0.24.  See id. at 206 nn.93–95. 
83. Id. at 206 n.95. 
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in skin color changed judgments of evidence and guilt; implicit biases measured 
by the IAT predicted how respondents evaluated identical pieces of information. 
We have a long line of juror research, as synthesized through a meta-
analysis, revealing that jurors of one race treat defendants of another race worse with 
respect to verdict and sentencing.  According to some experiments, that difference 
might take place more often in experimental settings when the case is not racially 
charged, which suggests that participants who seek to be fair will endeavor to 
correct for potential bias when the threat of potential race bias is obvious.  Finally, 
some recent work reveals that certain IATs can predict racial discrimination in the 
evaluation of evidence by mock jurors.  Unfortunately, because of the incredible 
difficulties in research design, we do not have studies that evaluate implicit bias in 
real criminal trials.  Accordingly, the existing body of research, while strongly sug-
gestive, provides inferential rather than direct support that implicit bias accounts for 
some of the race effects on conviction and sentencing. 
b. Judge 
Obviously, the judge plays a crucial role in various aspects of the trial, exer-
cising important discretion in setting bail,84 deciding motions, conducting and 
deciding what can be asked during jury selection, ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence, presiding over the trial, and rendering verdicts in some cases.  Again, as 
with the lawyers, there is no inherent reason to think that judges are immune 
from implicit biases.  The extant empirical evidence supports this assumption.85  Jeff 
Rachlinski and his coauthors are the only researchers who have measured the 
implicit biases of actual trial court judges.  They have given the race attitude IAT to 
judges from three different judicial districts.  Consistent with the general popula-
tion, the White judges showed strong implicit attitudes favoring Whites over Blacks.86 
  
84. See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 987, 992 (1994) (finding 35 percent higher bail amounts for Black defendants after controlling 
for eleven other variables besides race). 
85. Judge Bennett, a former civil rights lawyer, shares his unnerving discovery of his own disappointing 
IAT results in Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010). 
86. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2009).  White judges (N=85) showed an IAT effect M=216 ms (with a 
standard deviation of 201 ms).  87.1 percent of them were quicker to sort in the schema-consistent 
arrangement than in the schema-inconsistent one.  Black judges (N=43) showed a small bias M=26 
ms (with a standard deviation of 208 ms).  Only 44.2 percent of Black judges were quicker to sort in 
the schema-consistent arrangement than in the schema-inconsistent one.  See id. 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom 1147 
 
Rachlinski and colleagues investigated whether these biases predicted behav-
ioral differences by giving judges three different vignettes and asking for their 
views on various questions, ranging from the likelihood of defendant recidivism to 
the recommended verdict and confidence level.  Two of these vignettes revealed 
nothing about race, although some of the judges were subliminally primed with 
words designed to trigger the social category African American.  The third vignette 
explicitly identified the defendant (and victim) as White or Black and did not use 
subliminal primes.  After collecting the responses, Rachlinski et al. analyzed whether 
judges treated White or Black defendants differently and whether the IAT could 
predict any such difference. 
They found mixed results.  In the two subliminal priming vignettes, judges 
did not respond differently on average as a function of the primes.  In other words, 
the primes did not prompt them to be harsher on defendants across the board as 
prior priming studies with nonjudge populations had found.87  That said, the 
researchers found a marginally statistically significant interaction with IAT scores: 
Judges who had a greater degree of implicit bias against Blacks (and relative 
preference for Whites) were harsher on defendants (who were never racially identi-
fied) when they had been primed (with the Black words).  By contrast, those judges 
who had implicit attitudes in favor of Blacks were less harsh on defendants when 
they received the prime.88 
In the third vignette, a battery case that explicitly identified the defendant as 
one race and the victim as the other,89 the White judges showed equal likelihood 
of convicting the defendant, whether identified as White or Black.  By contrast, 
Black judges were much more likely to convict the defendant if he was identified 
as White as compared to Black.  When the researchers probed more deeply to 
see what, if anything, the IAT could predict, they did not find the sort of interaction 
that they found in the other two vignettes—in other words, judges with strong 
implicit biases in favor of Whites did not treat the Black defendant more harshly.90 
Noticing the difference between White and Black judge responses in the 
third vignette study, the researchers probed still deeper and found a three-way 
interaction between a judge’s race, a judge’s IAT score, and a defendant’s race.  No 
effect was found for White judges; the core finding concerned, instead, Black 
  
87. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent 
Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004). 
88. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1215.  An ordered logit regression was performed between the 
judge’s disposition against the priming condition, IAT score, and their interaction.  The interaction 
term was marginally significant at p=0.07.  See id. at 1214–15 n.94. 
89. This third vignette did not use any subliminal primes. 
90. See id. at 1202 n.41. 
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judges.  Those Black judges with a stronger Black preference on the IAT were 
less likely to convict the Black defendant (as compared to the White defendant); 
correlatively, those Black judges with a White preference on the IAT were more likely 
to convict the Black defendant.91 
It is hard to make simple sense of such complex findings, which may have 
been caused in part by the fact that the judges quickly sniffed out the purpose of the 
study—to detect racial discrimination.92  Given the high motivation not to perform 
race discrimination under research scrutiny, one could imagine that White judges 
might make sure to correct for any potential unfairness.  By contrast, Black 
judges may have felt less need to signal racial fairness, which might explain why 
Black judges showed different behaviors as a function of implicit bias whereas White 
judges did not.  
Put another way, data show that when the race of the defendant is 
explicitly identified to judges in the context of a psychology study (that is, the third 
vignette), judges are strongly motivated to be fair, which prompts a different 
response from White judges (who may think to themselves “whatever else, make 
sure not to treat the Black defendants worse”) than Black judges (who may 
think “give the benefit of the doubt to Black defendants”).  However, when race is 
not explicitly identified but implicitly primed (vignettes one and two), perhaps 
the judges’ motivation to be accurate and fair is not on full alert.  Notwithstand-
ing all the complexity, this study provides some suggestive evidence that implicit 
attitudes may be influencing judges’ behavior.  
4. Sentencing 
There is evidence that African Americans are treated worse than similarly 
situated Whites in sentencing.  For example, federal Black defendants were sen-
tenced to 12 percent longer sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984,93 and Black defendants are subject disproportionately to the death penalty.94  
  
91. Id. at 1220 n.114. 
92. See id. at 1223. 
93. See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence From the U.S. 
Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001) (examining federal judge sentencing under the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). 
94. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO GGD-90-57, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND 
HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH 
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990) (finding killers of White victims receive 
the death penalty more often than killers of Black victims); David C. Baldus et al., Racial 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, 
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Of course, it is possible that there is some good reason for that difference, based 
on the merits.  One way to check is to run experimental studies holding everything 
constant except for race.  
Probation officers.  In one study, Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery sublimi-
nally primed police officers and juvenile probation officers with words related to 
African Americans, such as “Harlem” or “dreadlocks.”  This subliminal priming 
led the officers to recommend harsher sentencing decisions.95  As we noted above, 
Rachlinski et al. found no such effect on the judges they tested using a similar but 
not identical method.96  But, at least in this study, an effect was found with 
police and probation officers.  Given that this was a subliminal prime, the merits 
could not have justified the different evaluations. 
Afrocentric features.  Irene Blair, Charles Judd, and Kristine Chapleau took 
photographs from a database of criminals convicted in Florida97 and asked partic-
ipants to judge how Afrocentric both White and Black inmates looked on a scale of 
one to nine.98  The goal was to see if race, facial features, or both correlated with 
actual sentencing.  Using multiple regression analysis, the researchers found that 
after controlling for the seriousness of the primary and additional offenses, the race of 
the defendant showed no statistical significance.99  In other words, White and Black 
defendants were sentenced without discrimination based on race.  According to the 
  
With Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1710–24 (1998) (finding 
mixed evidence that Black defendants are more likely to receive the death sentence). 
95. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 87. 
96. Priming studies are quite sensitive to details.  For example, the more subliminal a prime is (in time 
duration and in frequency), the less the prime tends to stick (the smaller the effects and the faster it 
dissipates).  Rachlinski et al. identified some differences between their experimental procedure and that 
of Graham and Lowery’s.  See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1213 n.88.  Interestingly, in the Rachlinski 
study, for judges from the eastern conference (seventy judges), a programming error made their sublim-
inal primes last only sixty-four milliseconds.  By contrast, for the western conference (forty-five 
judges), the prime lasted 153 milliseconds, which was close to the duration used by Graham and 
Lowery (150 milliseconds).  See id. at 1206 (providing numerical count of judges’ prime); id. at 1213 
n.84 (identifying the programming error).  Graham and Lowery wrote that they selected the priming 
durations through extensive pilot testing “to arrive at a presentation time that would allow the 
primes to be detectable but not identifiable.”  Graham & Lowery, supra note 87, at 489.  It is possible 
that the truncated priming duration for the eastern conference judges contributed to the different 
findings between Rachlinski et al. and Graham and Lowery. 
97. See Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 675 (2004) (selecting a sample of 100 Black inmates and 116 White inmates). 
98. Id. at 676.  Afrocentric meant full lips, broad nose, relatively darker skin color, and curly hair.  It is what 
participants socially understood to look African without any explicit instruction or definition.  See id. 
at 674 n.1. 
99. Id. at 676. 
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researchers, this is a success story based on various sentencing reforms specifically 
adopted by Florida mostly to decrease sentencing discretion.100 
However, when the researchers added Afrocentricity of facial features into 
their regressions, they found a curious correlation.  Within each race, either Black 
or White, the more Afrocentric the defendant looked, the harsher his punishment.101  
How much so?  If you picked a defendant who was one standard deviation above 
the mean in Afrocentric features and compared him to another defendant of the 
same race who was one standard deviation below the mean, there would be a sen-
tence difference of seven to eight months between them, holding constant any 
difference in their actual crime.102 
Again, if the research provides complex findings, we must grapple with a 
complex story.  On the one hand, we have good news: Black and White defen-
dants were, overall, sentenced comparably.  On the other hand, we have bad 
news: Within each race, the more stereotypically Black the defendant looked, 
the harsher the punishment.  What might make sense of such results?  According 
to the researchers, perhaps implicit bias was responsible.103  If judges are motivated to 
avoid racial discrimination, they may be on guard regarding the dangers of treating 
similarly situated Blacks worse than Whites.  On alert to this potential bias, the 
judges prevent it from causing any discriminatory behavior.  By contrast, judges have 
no conscious awareness that Afrocentric features might be triggering stereotypes 
of criminality and violence that could influence their judgment.  Without such 
awareness, they could not explicitly control or correct for the potential bias.104  If 
this explanation is correct, we have further evidence that discrimination is 
being driven in part by implicit biases and not solely by explicit-but-concealed biases. 
 
* * * 
 
Where does this whirlwind tour of psychological research findings leave us?  
In each of the stages of the criminal trial process discussed, the empirical research 
  
100. Id. at 677. 
101. Id. at 676–77.  Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues reached consistent findings when she used the 
same Florida photograph dataset to examine how Black defendants were sentenced to death.  After 
performing a median split on how stereotypical the defendant looked, the top half were sentenced to 
death 57.5 percent of the time compared to the bottom half, which were sentenced to death only 24.4 
percent of the time.  See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al.,  Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality 
of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 384 (2006).  
Interestingly, this effect was not observed when the victim was Black.  See id. at 385. 
102. See Blair et al., supra note 97, at 677–78. 
103. See id. at 678 (hypothesizing that “perhaps an equally pernicious and less controllable process [is] at work”). 
104. See id. at 677. 
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gives us reason to think that implicit biases—attitudes and beliefs that we are not 
directly aware of and may not endorse—could influence how defendants are 
treated and judged.  Wherever possible, in our description of the studies, we have 
tried to provide the magnitude of these effects.  But knowing precisely how much 
work they really do is difficult.  If we seek an estimate, reflective of an entire 
body of research and not any single study, one answer comes from the Greenwald 
meta-analysis, which found that the IAT (the most widely used, but not the 
only measure of implicit bias) could predict 5.6 percent of the variation of the behav-
ior in Black–White behavioral domains.105 
Should that be deemed a lot or a little?  In answering this question, we 
should be mindful of the collective impact of such biases, integrated over time 
(per person) and over persons (across all defendants).106  For a single defendant, 
these biases may surface for various decisionmakers repeatedly in policing, charg-
ing, bail, plea bargaining, pretrial motions, evidentiary motions, witness credibility, 
lawyer persuasiveness, guilt determination, sentencing recommendations, sentenc-
ing itself, appeal, and so on.  Even small biases at each stage may aggregate into 
a substantial effect. 
To get a more concrete sense, Anthony Greenwald has produced a simula-
tion that models cumulating racial disparities through five sequential stages of 
criminal justice—arrest, arraignment, plea bargain, trial, and sentence.  It sup-
poses that the probability of arrest having committed the offense is 0.50, that 
the probability of conviction at trial is 0.75, and that the effect size of implicit 
bias is r=0.1 at each stage.  Under this simulation, for a crime with a mean sentence 
of 5 years, and with a standard deviation of 2 years, Black criminals can expect a 
sentence of 2.44 years whereas White criminals can expect just 1.40 years.107  To 
appreciate the full social impact, we must next aggregate this sort of disparity a 
second time over all defendants subject to racial bias, out of an approximate annual 
  
105. See Greenwald et al., supra note 24, at 24 tbl.3 (showing that correlation between race attitude IAT 
(Black/White) and behavior in the meta-analysis is 0.236, which when squared equals 0.056, the 
percentage of variance explained). 
106. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1202; Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A 
Behavioral Realist Revision of  ‘Affirmative Action,’ 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1073 (2006). 
107. The simulation is available at Simulation: Cumulating Racial Disparities Through 5 Sequential Stages of 
Criminal Justice, http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/UCLA_PULSE.simulation.xlsx (last visited 
May 15, 2012).  If in the simulation the effect size of race discrimination at each step is increased 
from r=0.1 to r=0.2, which is less than the average effect size of race discrimination effects found in 
the 2009 meta-analysis, see supra note 105, the ratio of expected years of sentence would increase to 
3.11 years (Black) to 1.01 years (White). 
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total of 20.7 million state criminal cases108 and 70 thousand federal criminal cases.109  
And, as Robert Abelson has demonstrated, even small percentages of variance 
explained might amount to huge impacts.110  
B. The Civil Path 
Now, we switch from the criminal to the civil path and focus on the 
trajectory of an individual111 bringing suit in a federal employment discrimination 
case—and on how implicit bias might affect this process.  First, the plaintiff, who is 
a member of a protected class, believes that her employer has discriminated against 
her in some legally cognizable way.112  Second, after exhausting necessary adminis-
trative remedies,113 the plaintiff sues in federal court.  Third, the defendant tries to 
terminate the case before trial via a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6).  Fourth, should that 
fail, the defendant moves for summary judgment under FRCP 56.  Finally, should 
that motion also fail, the jury renders a verdict after trial.  Again, at each of these 
  
108. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK 
OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/FlashMicrosites/CSP/images/CSP2009.pdf. 
109. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1202. 
110. See Robert P. Abelson, A Variance Explanation Paradox: When a Little Is a Lot, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
129, 132 (1985) (explaining that the batting average of a 0.320 hitter or a 0.220 hitter predicts only 
1.4 percent of the variance explained for a single at-bat producing either a hit or no-hit).  Some 
discussion of this appears in Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 489. 
111. We acknowledge that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), made it much more 
difficult to certify large classes in employment discrimination cases.  See id. at 2553–54 (holding that 
statistical evidence of gender disparities combined with a sociologist’s analysis that Wal-Mart’s 
corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias was inadequate to show that members of the 
putative class had a common claim for purposes of class certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)).  
112. For example, in a Title VII cause of action for disparate treatment, the plaintiff must demonstrate an 
adverse employment action “because of” the plaintiff’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  By contrast, in a Title VII cause of action for disparate impact, the 
plaintiff challenges facially neutral policies that produce a disparate impact on protected populations.  See 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  We recognize that employment discrimination 
law is far more complex than presented here, with different elements for different state and federal 
causes of action. 
113. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) process is critical in practical 
terms because the failure to file a claim with the EEOC within the quite short statute of limitations 
(either 180 or 300 days depending on whether the jurisdiction has a state or local fair employment 
agency) or to timely file suit after resorting to the EEOC results in an automatic dismissal of the 
claim.  However, neither EEOC inaction nor an adverse determination preclude private suit.  See 2 
CHARLES SULLIVAN & LAUREN WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 12.03[B], at 672 (4th ed. 2012). 
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stages,114 implicit biases could potentially influence the outcome.  To maintain a 
manageable scope of analysis, we focus on employer discrimination, pretrial adju-
dication, and jury verdict. 
1. Employer Discrimination 
For many, the most interesting question is whether implicit bias helped 
cause the employer to discriminate against the plaintiff.  There are good reasons 
to think that some negative employment actions are indeed caused by implicit 
biases in what tort scholars call a “but-for” sense.  This but-for causation may be 
legally sufficient since Title VII and most state antidiscrimination statutes require 
only a showing that the plaintiff was treated less favorably “because of” a protected 
characteristic, such as race or sex.115  But our objective here is not to engage the doc-
trinal116 and philosophical questions117 of whether existing antidiscrimination laws 
do or should recognize implicit bias-actuated discrimination.  We also do not 
address what sorts of evidence should be deemed admissible when plaintiffs attempt 
to make such a case at trial.118  Although those questions are critically important, our 
  
114. As explained when we introduced the Criminal Path, the number of stages identified is somewhat 
arbitrary.  We could have listed more or fewer stages. 
115. Section 703(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual . . . because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
116. For discussion of legal implications, see Faigman, Dasgupta & Ridgeway, supra note 19; Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 2. 
117. For a philosophical analysis, see Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought 
Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (2010). 
118. For example, there is considerable disagreement on whether an expert should be allowed to testify that 
a particular case is an instance of implicit bias.  This issue is part of a much larger debate regarding 
scientists’ ability to make reasonable inferences about an individual case from group data.  John 
Monahan and Laurens Walker first pointed out that scientific evidence often comes to court at two 
different levels of generality, one general and one specific.  See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, 
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).  For instance, 
in a case involving the accuracy of an eyewitness identification, the general question might concern 
whether eyewitness identifications that are cross-racial are less reliable than same-race iden-
tifications; the specific question in the case would involve whether the cross-racial identification in 
this case was accurate.  Interested in social science evidence, Monahan and Walker referred to this 
as “social framework” evidence, though their fundamental insight regarding frameworks applies to all 
scientific evidence.  In the context of implicit biases, then, general research amply demonstrates the 
phenomenon in the population.  However, in the courtroom, the issue typically concerns whether a 
particular decision or action was a product of implicit bias.   
As a scientific matter, knowing that a phenomenon exists in a population does not necessarily 
mean that a scientist can reliably say that it was manifest in a particular case.  This has led to a debate as to 
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task is more limited—to give an empirical account of how implicit bias may 
potentially influence a civil litigation trajectory. 
Our belief that implicit bias causes some employment discrimination is based 
on the following evidence.  First, tester studies in the field—which involve sending 
identical applicants or applications except for some trait, such as race or gender—
have generally uncovered discrimination.  According to a summary by Mark Bendick 
and Ana Nunes, there have been “several dozen testing studies” in the past two 
decades, in multiple countries, focusing on discrimination against various 
demographic groups (including women, the elderly, and racial minorities).119  
These studies consistently reveal typical “net rates of discrimination” that range 
from 20–40 percent.120  In other words, in 20–40 percent of cases, employers treat 
subordinated groups (for example, racial minorities) worse than privileged groups 
(for example, Whites) even though the testers were carefully controlled to be iden-
tically qualified.  
Second, although tester studies do not distinguish between explicit versus 
implicit bias, various laboratory experiments have found implicit bias correlations 
with discriminatory evaluations.  For example, Laurie Rudman and Peter Glick 
demonstrated that in certain job conditions, participants treated a self-promoting 
and competent woman, whom the researchers termed “agentic,” worse than an 
  
whether experts should be limited to testifying only to the general phenomenon or should be allowed 
to opine on whether a particular case is an instance of the general phenomenon.  This is a 
complicated issue and scholars have weighed in on both sides.  For opposition to the use of expert 
testimony that a specific case is an instance of implicit bias, see Faigman, Dasgupta & Ridgeway, 
supra note 19, at 1394 (“The research . . . does not demonstrate that an expert can validly determine 
whether implicit bias caused a specific employment decision.”); and John Monahan, Laurens Walker 
& Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social 
Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2008) (“[Testimony] in which the expert witness explicitly 
linked general research findings on gender discrimination to specific factual conclusions . . . exceeded 
the limitations on expert testimony established by the Federal Rules of Evidence and by both the 
original and revised proposal of what constitutes ‘social framework’ evidence.”).  For advancement 
of allowing expert testimony that a particular case is an instance of some general phenomenon, see 
Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Standards for Using Social Psychological Evidence in Employment 
Discrimination Proceedings, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 867, 876 (2011) (“Qualified social scientists who 
provide general, relevant knowledge and apply ordinary scientific reasoning may offer informal 
opinion about the individual case, but probabilistically.”). 
In the end, lawyers may be able to work around this dispute by using an expert to provide social 
framework evidence that identifies particular attributes that exacerbate biased decisionmaking, then 
immediately calling up another witness who is personally familiar with the defendant’s work envi-
ronment and asking that witness whether each of those particular attributes exists. 
119. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling Bias in Hiring, 68 J. 
SOC. ISSUES (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.bendickegan.com/pdf/Sent_to_JSI_Feb_27_2010.pdf. 
120. Id. (manuscript at 15). 
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equally agentic man.121  When the job description explicitly required the employee 
to be cooperative and to work well with others, participants rated the agentic female 
less hirable than the equally agentic male.122  Probing deeper, the researchers 
identified that the participants penalized the female candidate for lack of social 
skills, not incompetence.123  Explicit bias measures did not correlate with the 
rankings; however, an implicit gender stereotype (associating women as more 
communal than agentic)124 did correlate negatively with the ratings for social skills.  
In other words, the higher the implicit gender stereotype, the lower the social 
skills evaluation.125 
Third, field experiments have provided further confirmation under real-
world conditions.  The studies by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan 
demonstrating discrimination in callbacks because of the names on comparable 
resumes have received substantial attention in the popular press as well as in law 
reviews.126  These studies found that for equally qualified—indeed, otherwise iden-
tical candidates, firms called back “Emily” more often than “Lakisha.”127  Less 
attention has been paid to Dan-Olof Rooth’s extensions of this work, which 
found similar callback discrimination but also found correlations between implicit 
stereotypes and the discriminatory behavior.128  Rooth has found these correlations 
  
121. Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic 
Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 757 (2001).  Agentic qualities were signaled by a life philosophy 
essay and canned answers to a videotaped interview that emphasized self-promotion and competence.  
See id. at 748.  Agentic candidates were contrasted with candidates whom the researchers labeled 
“androgynous”—they also demonstrated the characteristics of interdependence and cooperation.  Id. 
122. The difference was M=2.84 versus M=3.52 on a 5 point scale (p<0.05).  See id. at 753.  No gender 
bias was shown when the job description was ostensibly masculine and did not call for cooperative 
behavior.  Also, job candidates that were engineered to be androgynous—in other words, to show both 
agentic and cooperative traits—were treated the same regardless of gender.  See id. 
123. See id. at 753–54. 
124. The agentic stereotype was captured by word stimuli such as “independent,” “autonomous,” and 
“competitive.”  The communal stereotype was captured by words such as “communal,” “cooperative,” 
and “kinship.”  See id. at 750. 
125. See id. at 756 (r=–0.49, p<0.001).  For further description of the study in the law reviews, see Kang, 
supra note 46, at 1517–18. 
126. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha 
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).  A 
search of the TP-ALL database in Westlaw on December 10, 2011 revealed ninety-six hits. 
127. Id. at 992. 
128. Dan-Olof Rooth, Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence, 17 
LABOUR ECON. 523 (2010) (finding that implicit stereotypes, as measured by the IAT, predicted 
differential callbacks of Swedish-named versus Arab-Muslim-named resumes).  An increase of one 
standard deviation in implicit stereotype produced almost a 12 percent decrease in the probability that 
an Arab/Muslim candidate received an interview.  See id. 
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with not only implicit stereotypes about ethnic groups (Swedes versus Arab-Muslims) 
but also implicit stereotypes about the obese.129 
Because implicit bias in the courtroom is our focus, we will not attempt to 
offer a comprehensive summary of the scientific research as applied to the implicit 
bias in the workplace.130  We do, however, wish briefly to highlight lines of 
research—variously called “constructed criteria,” “shifting standards,” or “casuistry”—
that emphasize the malleability of merit.  We focus on this work because it has 
received relatively little coverage in the legal literature and may help explain how 
complex decisionmaking with multiple motivations occurs in the real world.131  
Moreover, this phenomenon may influence not only the defendant (accused of 
discrimination) but also the jurors who are tasked to judge the merits of the 
plaintiff’s case. 
Broadly speaking, this research demonstrates that people frequently engage in 
motivated reasoning132 in selection decisions that we justify by changing merit 
criteria on the fly, often without conscious awareness.  In other words, as between 
two plausible candidates that have different strengths and weaknesses, we first choose 
the candidate we like—a decision that may well be influenced by implicit factors—
and then justify that choice by molding our merit standards accordingly.  
We can make this point more concrete.  In one experiment, Eric Luis 
Uhlmann and Geoffrey Cohen asked participants to evaluate two finalists for 
police chief—one male, the other female.133  One candidate’s profile signaled book 
smart, the other’s profile signaled streetwise, and the experimental design varied 
which profile attached to the woman and which to the man.  Regardless of which 
attributes the male candidate featured, participants favored the male candidate 
and articulated their hiring criteria accordingly.  For example, education (book 
  
129. Jens Agerström & Dan-Olof Rooth, The Role of Automatic Obesity Stereotypes in Real Hiring 
Discrimination, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 790 (2011) (finding that hiring managers (N=153) 
holding more negative IAT-measured automatic stereotypes about the obese were less likely to invite 
an obese applicant for an interview). 
130. Thankfully, many of these studies have already been imported into the legal literature.  For a 
review of the science, see Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 484–85 (discussing evidence of racial bias in 
how actual managers sort resumes and of correlations between implicit biases, as measured by the 
IAT, and differential callback rates). 
131. One recent exception is Rich, supra note 25. 
132. For discussion of motivated reasoning in organizational contexts, see Sung Hui Kim, The Banality 
of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1029–34 (2005). 
Motivated reasoning is “the process through which we assimilate information in a self-serving manner.” 
Id. at 1029. 
133. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify 
Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 475 (2005). 
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smarts) was considered more important when the man had it.134  Surprisingly, 
even the attribute of being family oriented and having children was deemed more 
important when the man had it.135 
Michael Norton, Joseph Vandello, and John Darley have made similar 
findings, again in the domain of gender.136  Participants were put in the role of 
manager of a construction company who had to hire a high-level employee.  One 
candidate’s profile signaled more education; the other’s profile signaled more 
experience.  Participants ranked these candidates (and three other filler candidates), 
and then explained their decisionmaking by writing down “what was most 
important in determining [their] decision.”137 
In the control condition, the profiles were given with just initials (not full 
names) and thus the test subjects could not assess their gender.  In this condition, 
participants preferred the higher educated candidate 76 percent of the time.138  In 
the two experimental conditions, the profiles were given names that signaled 
gender, with the man having higher education in one condition and the woman 
having higher education in the other.  When the man had higher education, 
the participants preferred him 75 percent of the time.  In sharp contrast, when the 
woman had higher education, only 43 percent of the participants preferred her.139  
The discrimination itself is not as interesting as how the discrimination 
was justified.  In the control condition and the man-has-more-education condi-
tion, the participants ranked education as more important than experience about 
half the time (48 percent and 50 percent).140  By contrast, in the woman-has-more-
education condition, only 22 percent ranked education as more important than 
experience.141  In other words, what counted as merit was redefined, in real time, 
to justify hiring the man. 
Was this weighting done consciously, as part of a strategy to manipulate 
merit in order to provide a cover story for decisionmaking caused and motivated by 
explicit bias?  Or, was merit refactored in a more automatic, unconscious, dissonance-
reducing rationalization, which would be more consistent with an implicit bias 
story?  Norton and colleagues probed this causation question in another series of 
  
134. See id. (M=8.27 with education versus M=7.07 without education, on a 11 point scale; p=0.006; d=1.02). 
135. See id. (M=6.21 with family traits versus 5.08 without family traits; p=0.05; d=0.86). 
136. Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
817 (2004). 
137. Id. at 820. 
138. Id. at 821. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id.  
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experiments, in the context of race and college admissions.142  In a prior study, they 
had found that Princeton undergraduate students shifted merit criteria—the relative 
importance of GPA versus the number of AP classes taken—to select the Black 
applicant over the White applicant who shared the same cumulative SAT score.143  
To see whether this casuistry was explicit and strategic or implicit and automatic, 
they ran another experiment in which participants merely rated admissions criteria 
in the abstract without selecting a candidate for admission.  
Participants were simply told that they were participating in a study 
examining the criteria most important to college admissions decisions.  They were 
given two sample resumes to familiarize themselves with potential criteria.  Both 
resumes had equivalent cumulative SAT scores, but differed on GPA (4.0 versus 
3.6) versus number of AP classes taken (9 versus 6).  Both resumes also disclosed 
the applicant’s race.  In one condition, the White candidate had the higher GPA 
(and fewer AP classes); in the other condition, the African American candidate had 
the higher GPA (and fewer AP classes).144  After reviewing the samples, the partic-
ipants had to rank order eight criteria in importance, including GPA, number of 
AP classes, SAT scores, athletic participation, and so forth. 
In the condition with the Black candidate having the higher GPA, 77 percent 
of the participants ranked GPA higher in importance than number of AP classes 
taken.  By contrast, when the White candidate had the higher GPA, only 63 
percent of the participants ranked GPA higher than AP classes.  This change in 
the weighting happened even though the participants did not expect that they 
were going to make an admissions choice or to justify that choice.  Thus, these 
differences could not be readily explained in purely strategic terms, as methods for 
justifying a subsequent decision.  According to the authors,  
[t]hese results suggest not only that it is possible for people to reweight 
criteria deliberately to justify choices but also that decisions made under 
such social constraints can impact information processing even prior 
to making a choice.  This suggests that the bias we observed is not 
simply post hoc and strategic but occurs as an organic part of making 
decisions when social category information is present.145 
  
142. Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate 
Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 42 (2006). 
143. Id. at 44. 
144. See id.  
145. Id. at 46–47.  This does not, however, fully establish that these differences were the result of implicit 
views rather than explicit ones.  Even if test subjects did not expect to have to make admissions 
determinations, they might consciously select criteria that they believed favored one group over another. 
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The ways that human decisionmakers may subtly adjust criteria in real time 
to modify their judgments of merit has significance for thinking about the ways 
that implicit bias may potentially influence employment decisions.  In effect, bias 
can influence decisions in ways contrary to the standard and seemingly com-
monsensical model.  The conventional legal model describes behavior as a product 
of discrete and identifiable motives.  This research suggests, however, that implicit 
motivations might influence behavior and that we then rationalize those decisions 
after the fact.  Hence, some employment decisions might be motivated by implicit 
bias but rationalized post hoc based on nonbiased criteria.  This process of reasoning 
from behavior to motives, as opposed to the folk-psychology assumption that the 
arrow of direction is from motives to behavior, is, in fact, consistent with a large body 
of contemporary psychological research.146 
2. Pretrial Adjudication: 12(b)(6) 
As soon as a plaintiff files the complaint, the defendant will try to dismiss as 
many of the claims in the complaint as possible.  Before recent changes in pleading, 
a motion to dismiss a complaint under FRCP 8 and FRCP 12(b)(6) was decided 
under the relatively lax standard of Conley v. Gibson.147  Under Conley, all factual 
allegations made in the complaint were assumed to be true.  As such, the court’s 
task was simply to ask whether “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim.”148 
Starting with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,149 which addressed complex 
antitrust claims of parallel conduct, and further developed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,150 
which addressed civil rights actions based on racial and religious discrimination 
post-9/11, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the Conley standard.  First, district 
courts must now throw out factual allegations made in the complaint if they are 
merely conclusory.151  Second, courts must decide on the plausibility of the claim 
based on the information before them.152  In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that 
  
146. See generally TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE 
UNCONSCIOUS (2002). 
147. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  
148. Id. at 45–46. 
149. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
150. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
151. Id. at 1951. 
152. Id. at 1950–52. 
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because of an “obvious alternative explanation”153 of earnest national security response, 
purposeful racial or religious “discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.”154 
How are courts supposed to decide what is “Twom-bal”155 plausible when the 
motion to dismiss happens before discovery, especially in civil rights cases in which 
the defendant holds the key information?  According to the Court, “[d]etermining 
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific 
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.”156 
And when judges turn to their judicial experience and common sense, what 
will this store of knowledge tell them about whether some particular comment or 
act happened and whether such behavior evidences legally cognizable discrimination?  
Decades of social psychological research demonstrate that our impressions are 
driven by the interplay between categorical (general to the category) and individ-
uating (specific to the member of the category) information.  For example, in 
order to come to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile general 
schemas for Latina workers with individualized data about the specific plaintiff.  
When we lack sufficient individuating information—which is largely the state of 
affairs at the motion to dismiss stage—we have no choice but to rely more heavily 
on our schemas.157 
Moreover, consider what the directive to rely on common sense means in 
light of social judgeability theory.158  According to this theory, there are social rules 
that tell us when it is appropriate to judge someone.  For example, suppose your 
fourth grade child told you that a new kid, Hannah, has enrolled in school and that 
she receives free lunches.  Your child then asks you whether you think she is smart.  
You will probably decline to answer since you do not feel entitled to make that 
judgment.  Without more probative information, you feel that you would only be 
crudely stereotyping her abilities based on her socioeconomic status.  But what if 
the next day you volunteered in the classroom and spent twelve minutes observing 
  
153. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154. Id. at 1952. 
155. See In re Iowa Ready-Mix Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. C 10-4038-MWB, 2011 WL 5547159, at 
*1 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 9, 2011) (referring to a Twombly-Iqbal motion as “Twom-bal”). 
156. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940. 
157. These schemas also reflect cultural cognitions.  See generally Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and 
the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1455 (2010); Dan M. Kahan, David A. 
Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). 
158. See Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of Meta-Informational Cues on the Use of 
Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1994). 
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Hannah interacting with a teacher trying to solve problems?  Would you then feel 
that you had enough individuating information to come to some judgment? 
This is precisely what John Darley and Paget Gross tested in a seminal 
experiment in 1983.159  When participants only received economic status infor-
mation, they declined to evaluate Hannah’s intelligence as a function of her eco-
nomic class.  However, when they saw a twelve-minute videotape of the child 
answering a battery of questions, participants felt credentialed to judge the girl, 
and they did so in a way that was consistent with stereotypes.  What they did not 
realize was that the individuating information in the videotape was purposefully 
designed to be ambiguous.  So participants who were told that Hannah was rich 
interpreted the video as confirmation that she was smart.  By contrast, participants 
who were told that Hannah was poor interpreted the same video as confirmation 
that she was not so bright.160 
Vincent Yzerbyt and colleagues, who call this phenomenon “social 
judgeability,” have produced further evidence of this effect.161  If researchers told 
you that a person is either an archivist or a comedian and then asked you twenty 
questions about this person regarding their degree of extroversion with the 
options of “True,” “False,” or “I don’t know,” how might you answer?  What if, in 
addition, they manufactured an illusion that you were given individuating 
information—information about the specific individual and not just the category 
he or she belongs to—even though you actually did not receive any such infor-
mation?162  This is precisely what Yzerbyt and colleagues did in the lab. 
They found that those operating under the illusion of individuating infor-
mation were more confident in their answers in that they marked fewer questions 
with “I don’t know.”163  They also found that those operating under the illusion 
gave more stereotype-consistent answers.164  In other words, the illusion of being 
informed made the target judgeable.  Because the participants, in fact, had received 
no such individuating information, they tended to judge the person in accordance 
with their schemas about archivists and comedians.  Interestingly, “in the debriefings, 
  
159. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 22–23 (1983). 
160. See id. at 24–25, 27–29. 
161. See Yzerbyt et al., supra note 158. 
162. This illusion was created by having participants go through a listening exercise, in which they were told 
to focus only on one speaker (coming through one ear of a headset) and ignore the other (coming 
through the other).  They were later told that the speaker that they were told to ignore had in fact 
provided relevant individuating information.  The truth was, however, that no such information had 
been given.  See id. at 50. 
163. See id. at 51 (M=5.07 versus 10.13; p<0.003). 
164. See id. (M=9.97 versus 6.30, out of 1 to 20 point range; p<0.006). 
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subjects reported that they did not judge the target on the basis of a stereotype; 
they were persuaded that they had described a real person qua person.”165  Again, 
it is possible that they were concealing their explicitly embraced bias about 
archivists and comedians from probing researchers, but we think that it is more 
probable that implicit bias explains these results. 
Social judgeability theory connects back to Iqbal in that the Supreme 
Court has altered the rules structuring the judgeability of plaintiffs and their 
complaints.  Under Conley, judges were told not to judge without the facts and 
thus were supposed to allow the lawsuit to get to discovery unless no set of facts 
could state a legal claim.  By contrast, under Iqbal, judges have been explicitly 
green-lighted to judge the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim based only on the 
minimal facts that can be alleged before discovery—and this instruction came in 
the context of a racial discrimination case.  In other words, our highest court has 
entitled district court judges to make this judgment based on a quantum of infor-
mation that may provide enough facts to render the claim socially judgeable but 
not enough facts to ground that judgment in much more than the judge’s schemas.  
Just as Yzerbyt’s illusion of individuating information entitled participants to judge 
in the laboratory, the express command of the Supreme Court may entitle 
judges to judge in the courtroom when they lack any well-developed basis to do so. 
There are no field studies to test whether biases, explicit or implicit, influ-
ence how actual judges decide motions to dismiss actual cases.  It is not clear 
that researchers could ever collect such information.  All that we have are some 
preliminary data about dismissal rates before and after Iqbal that are consistent 
with our analysis.  Again, since Iqbal made dismissals easier, we should see an 
increase in dismissal rates across the board.166  More relevant to our hypothesis 
is whether certain types of cases experienced differential changes in dismissal rates.  
For instance, we would expect Iqbal to generate greater increases in dismissal 
rates for race discrimination claims than, say, contract claims.  There are a 
number of potential reasons for this: One reason is that judges are likely to have 
stronger biases that plaintiffs in the former type of case have less valid claims 
than those in the latter.  Another reason is that we might expect some kinds of cases 
  
165. Id. 
166. In the first empirical study of Iqbal, Hatamyar sampled 444 cases under Conley (from May 2005 to 
May 2007) and 173 cases under Iqbal (from May 2009 to August 2009).  See Patricia W. Hatamyar, 
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 597 (2010).  
She found that the general rate of complaint dismissal rose from 46 percent to 56 percent.  See id. at 602 
tbl.2.  However, this finding was not statistically significant under a Pearson chi-squared distribution test 
examining the different dismissal rates for Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal for three results: grant, mixed, 
and deny. 
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to raise more significant concerns about asymmetric information than do others.  
In contracts disputes, both parties may have good information about most of the rel-
evant facts even prior to discovery.  In employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs 
may have good hunches about how they have been discriminated against, but 
prior to discovery they may not have access to the broad array of information in the 
employer’s possession that may be necessary to turn the hunch into something a 
judge finds plausible.  Moreover, these two reasons potentially interact: the more 
gap filling and inferential thinking that a judge has to engage in, the more room 
there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge’s assessment in 
the absence of a well-developed evidentiary record. 
Notwithstanding the lack of field studies on these issues, there is some evi-
dentiary support for these differential changes in dismissal rates.  For example, 
Patricia Hatamayr sorted a sample of cases before and after Iqbal into six major 
categories: contracts, torts, civil rights, labor, intellectual property, and all other 
statutory cases.167  She found that in contract cases, the rate of dismissal did not 
change much from Conley (32 percent) to Iqbal (32 percent).168  By contrast, for 
Title VII cases, the rate of dismissal increased from 42 percent to 53 percent.169  
Victor Quintanilla has collected more granular data by counting not Title VII cases 
generally but federal employment discrimination cases filed specifically by Black 
plaintiffs both before and after Iqbal.170  He found an even larger jump.  Under the 
Conley regime, courts granted only 20.5 percent of the motions to dismiss such 
cases.  By contrast, under the Iqbal regime, courts granted 54.6 percent of them.171  
These data lend themselves to multiple interpretations and suffer from various 
confounds.  So at this point, we can make only modest claims.  We merely suggest 
that the dismissal rate data are consistent with our hypothesis that Iqbal’s plau-
sibility standard poses a risk of increasing the impact of implicit biases at the 
12(b)(6) stage. 
If, notwithstanding the plausibility-based pleading requirements, the case gets 
past the motion to dismiss, then discovery will take place, after which defendants 
will seek summary judgment under FRCP 56.  On the one hand, this proce-
dural posture is less subject to implicit biases than the motion to dismiss because 
more individuating information will have surfaced through discovery.  On the 
  
167. See id. at 591–93. 
168. See id. at 630 tbl.D. 
169. See id. 
170. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims 
of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011).  Quintanilla counted both Title VII and 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 cases. 
171. See id. at 36 tbl.1 (p<0.000). 
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other hand, the judge still has to make a judgment call on whether any “genuine 
dispute as to any material fact”172 remains.  Similar decisionmaking dynamics are 
likely to be in play as we saw in the pleading stage, for a significant quantum of 
discretion remains.  Certainly the empirical evidence that demonstrates how poorly 
employment discrimination claims fare on summary judgment is not inconsistent 
with this view, though, to be sure, myriad other explanations of these differences 
are possible (including, for example, doctrinal obstacles to reaching a jury).173 
3. Jury Verdict 
If the case gets to trial, the parties will introduce evidence on the merits of the 
claim.  Sometimes the evidence will be physical objects, such as documents, emails, 
photographs, voice recordings, evaluation forms, and the like.  The rest of it will 
be witness or expert testimony, teased out and challenged by lawyers on both 
sides.  Is there any reason to think that jurors might interpret the evidence in line 
with their biases?  In the criminal trajectory, we already learned of juror bias via 
meta-analyses as well as correlations with implicit biases.  Unfortunately, we lack 
comparable studies in the civil context.  What we offer are two sets of related argu-
ments and evidence that speak to the issue: motivation to shift standards and 
performer preference. 
a. Motivation to Shift Standards 
Above, we discussed the potential malleability of merit determinations when 
judgments permit discretion and reviewed how employer defendants might shift 
standards and reweight criteria when evaluating applicants and employees.  Here, 
we want to recognize that a parallel phenomenon may affect juror decisionmaking.  
Suppose that a particular juror is White and that he identifies strongly with his 
Whiteness.  Suppose further that the defendant is White and is being sued by a 
racial minority.  The accusation of illegal and immoral behavior threatens the 
  
172. FED R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
173. See, e.g., Charlotte L. Lanvers, Different Federal Court, Different Disposition: An Empirical Comparison 
of ADA, Title VII Race and Sex, and ADEA Employment Discrimination Dispositions in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia, 16 CORNELL J.L. & POL’Y 381, 395 
(2007); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates Over Time, Across 
Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts (Cornell Law 
Sch. Research Paper No. 08-022, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373 (finding that 
civil rights cases, and particularly employment discrimination cases, have a consistently higher summary 
judgment rate than non–civil rights cases). 
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status of the juror’s racial ingroup.  Anca Miron, Nyla Branscombe, and Monica 
Biernat have demonstrated that this threat to the ingroup can motivate people to 
shift standards in a direction that shields the ingroup from ethical responsibility.174 
Miron and colleagues asked White undergraduates at the University of Kansas 
to state how strongly they identified with America.175  Then they were asked 
various questions about America’s relationship to slavery and its aftermath.  These 
questions clumped into three categories (or constructs): judgments of harm done to 
Blacks,176 standards of injustice,177 and collective guilt.178  Having measured these 
various constructs, the researchers looked for relationships among them.  Their 
hypothesis was that the greater the self-identification with America, the higher 
the standards would be before being willing to call America racist or otherwise mor-
ally blameworthy (that is, the participants would set higher confirmatory standards).  
They found that White students who strongly identified as American set higher 
standards for injustice (that is, they wanted more evidence before calling America 
unjust);179 they thought less harm was done by slavery;180 and, as a result, they 
felt less collective guilt compared to other White students who identified less 
with America.181  In other words, their attitudes toward America were correlated 
with the quantum of evidence they required to reach a judgment that America had 
been unjust. 
In a subsequent study, Miron et al. tried to find evidence of causation, not 
merely correlation.  They did so by experimentally manipulating national identi-
fication by asking participants to recount situations in which they felt similar to 
other Americans (evoking greater identification with fellow Americans) or different 
from other Americans (evoking less identification with fellow Americans).182  
  
174. Anca M. Miron, Nyla R. Branscombe & Monica Biernat, Motivated Shifting of Justice Standards, 36 
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 768, 769 (2010). 
175. The participants were all American citizens.  The question asked was, “I feel strong ties with other 
Americans.”  Id. at 771. 
176. A representative question was, “How much damage did Americans cause to Africans?” on a “very 
little” (1) to “very much” (7) Likert scale.  Id. at 770. 
177. “Please indicate what percentage of Americans would have had to be involved in causing harm to 
Africans for you to consider the past United States a racist nation” on a scale of 0–10 percent, 10–25 
percent, up to 90–100 percent.  Id. at 771. 
178. “I feel guilty for my nation’s harmful past actions toward African Americans” on a “strongly disagree” 
(1) to “strongly agree” (9) Likert scale.  Id. 
179. See id. at 772 tbl.I (r=0.26, p<0.05). 
180. See id. (r=–0.23, p<0.05). 
181. See id. (r=–0.21, p<0.05).  Using structural equation modeling, the researchers found that standards of 
injustice fully mediated the relationship between group identification and judgments of harm; 
also, judgments of harm fully mediated the effect of standards on collective guilt.  See id. at 772–73. 
182. The manipulation was successful.  See id. at 773 (p<0.05, d=0.54.). 
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Those who were experimentally made to feel less identification with America 
subsequently reported very different standards of justice and collective guilt 
compared to others made to feel more identification with America.  Specifically, 
participants in the low identification condition set lower standards for calling 
something unjust, they evaluated slavery’s harms as higher, and they felt more 
collective guilt.  By contrast, participants in the high identification condition set 
higher standards for calling something unjust (that is, they required more 
evidence), they evaluated slavery’s harms as less severe, and they felt less guilt.183  In 
other words, by experimentally manipulating how much people identified with 
their ingroup (in this case, American), researchers could shift the justice standard 
that participants deployed to judge their own ingroup for harming the outgroup. 
Evidentiary standards for jurors are specifically articulated (for example, 
“preponderance of the evidence”) but substantively vague.  The question is how 
a juror operationalizes that standard—just how much evidence does she require for 
believing that this standard has been met?  These studies show how our assessments 
of evidence—of how much is enough—are themselves potentially malleable.  One 
potential source of malleability is, according to this research, a desire (most likely 
implicit) to protect one’s ingroup status.  If a juror strongly identifies with the 
defendant employer as part of the same ingroup—racially or otherwise—the juror 
may shift standards of proof upwards in response to attack by an outgroup plaintiff.  
In other words, jurors who implicitly perceive an ingroup threat may require more 
evidence to be convinced of the defendant’s harmful behavior than they would in 
an otherwise identical case that did not relate to their own ingroup.  Ingroup 
threat is simply an example of this phenomenon; the point is that implicit biases 
may influence jurors by affecting how they implement ambiguous decision criteria 
regarding both the quantum of proof and how they make inferences from ambig-
uous pieces of information. 
b. Performer Preference 
Jurors will often receive evidence and interpretive cues from performers at 
trial, by which we mean the cast of characters in the courtroom who jurors see, such 
as the judge, lawyers, parties, and witnesses.  These various performers are playing 
roles of one sort or another.  And, it turns out that people tend to have stereotypes 
about the ideal employee or worker that vary depending on the segment of the labor 
  
183. In standards for injustice, M=2.60 versus 3.39; on judgments of harm, M=5.82 versus 5.42; on 
collective guilt, M=6.33 versus 4.60.  All differences were statistically significant at p=0.05 or less.  See id. 
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market.  For example, in high-level professional jobs and leadership roles, the 
supposedly ideal employee is often a White man.184  When the actual performer 
does not fit the ideal type, people may evaluate the performance more negatively. 
One study by Jerry Kang, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Kumar Yogeeswaran, and 
Gary Blasi found just such performer preference with respect to lawyers, as a func-
tion of race.185  Kang and colleagues measured the explicit and implicit beliefs about 
the ideal lawyer held by jury-eligible participants from Los Angeles.  The 
researchers were especially curious whether participants had implicit stereotypes 
linking the ideal litigator with particular racial groups (White versus Asian 
American).  In addition to measuring their biases, the researchers had participants 
evaluate two depositions, which they heard via headphones and simultaneously 
read on screen.  At the beginning of each deposition, participants were shown for 
five seconds a picture of the litigator conducting the deposition on a computer 
screen accompanied by his name.  The race of the litigator was varied by name and 
photograph.  Also, the deposition transcript identified who was speaking, which 
meant that participants repeatedly saw the attorneys’ last names.186 
The study discovered the existence of a moderately strong implicit stere-
otype associating litigators with Whiteness (IAT D=0.45);187 this stereotype 
correlated with more favorable evaluations of the White lawyer (ingroup favoritism 
since 91% of the participants were White) in terms of his competence (r=0.32, 
p<0.01), likeability (r=0.31, p<0.01), and hireability (r=0.26, p<0.05).188  These 
results were confirmed through hierarchical regressions.  To appreciate the magni-
tude of the effect sizes, imagine a juror who has no explicit stereotype but a large 
implicit stereotype (IAT D=1) that the ideal litigator is White.  On a 7-point 
scale, this juror would favor a White lawyer over an identical Asian American 
  
184. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders, 
109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573 (2002); Alice H. Eagly, Steven J. Karau & Mona G. Makhijani, Gender and 
the Effectiveness of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125 (1995); see also JOAN WILLIAMS, 
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
213–17 (2000) (discussing how conceptions of merit are designed around masculine norms); Shelley 
J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297 (2007). 
185. See Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 886 (2010). 
186. See id. at 892–99 (describing method and procedure, and identifying attorney names as “William Cole” 
or “Sung Chang”). 
187. See id. at 900.  They also found strong negative implicit attitudes against Asian Americans (IAT 
D=0.62).  See id.  
188. Id. at 901 tbl.3.   
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lawyer 6.01 to 5.65 in terms of competence, 5.57 to 5.27 in terms of likability, and 
5.65 to 4.92 in terms of hireability.189 
This study provides some evidence that potential jurors’ implicit stereotypes 
cause racial discrimination in judging attorney performance of basic depositions.  
What does this have to do with how juries might decide employment discrim-
ination cases?  Of course, minority defendants do not necessarily hire minority 
attorneys.  That said, it is possible that minorities do hire minority attorneys at 
somewhat higher rates than nonminorities.  But even more important, we hypoth-
esize that similar processes might take place with how jurors evaluate not only 
attorneys but also both parties and witnesses, as they perform their various roles at 
trial.  To be sure, this study does not speak directly to credibility assessments, likely 
to be of special import at trial, but it does at least suggest that implicit stereotypes 
may affect judgment of performances in the courtroom. 
We concede that our claims about implicit bias influencing jury 
decisionmaking in civil cases are somewhat speculative and not well quantified.  
Moreover, in the real world, certain institutional processes may make both explicit 
and implicit biases less likely to translate into behavior.  For example, jurors must 
deliberate with other jurors, and sometimes the jury features significant demographic 
diversity, which seems to deepen certain types of deliberation.190  Jurors also feel 
accountable191 to the judge, who reminds them to adhere to the law and the merits.  
That said, for reasons already discussed, it seems implausible to think that current 
practices within the courtroom somehow magically burn away all jury biases, 
especially implicit biases of which jurors and judges are unaware.  That is why we 
seek improvements based on the best understanding of how people actually behave. 
Thus far, we have canvassed much of the available evidence describing how 
implicit bias may influence decisionmaking processes in both criminal and civil 
cases.  On the one hand, the research findings are substantial and robust.  On the 
other hand, they provide only imperfect knowledge, especially about what is 
actually happening in the real world.  Notwithstanding this provisional and lim-
ited knowledge, we strongly believe that these studies, in aggregate, suggest that 
implicit bias in the trial process is a problem worth worrying about.  What, then, 
can be done?  Based on what we know, how might we intervene to improve the 
trial process and potentially vaccinate decisionmakers against, or at least reduce, 
the influence of implicit bias? 
  
189. These figures were calculated using the regression equations in id. at 902 n.25, 904 n.27. 
190. See infra text accompanying notes 241–245. 
191. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 267–70 (1999). 
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III. INTERVENTIONS 
Before we turn explicitly to interventions, we reiterate that there are many 
causes of unfairness in the courtroom, and our focus on implicit bias is not meant 
to deny other causes.  In Part II, we laid out the empirical case for why we believe 
that implicit biases influence both criminal and civil case trajectories.  We now 
identify interventions that build on an overlapping scientific and political consensus.  
If there are cost-effective interventions that are likely to decrease the impact of 
implicit bias in the courtroom, we believe they should be adopted at least as forms 
of experimentation. 
We are mindful of potential costs, including implementation and even 
overcorrection costs.  But we are hopeful that these costs can be safely minimized.  
Moreover, the potential benefits of these improvements are both substantive and 
expressive.  Substantively, the improvements may increase actual fairness by decreas-
ing the impact of implicit biases; expressively, they may increase the appearance of 
fairness by signaling the judiciary’s thoughtful attempts to go beyond cosmetic 
compliance.192  Effort is not always sufficient, but it ought to count for something. 
A. Decrease the Implicit Bias 
If implicit bias causes unfairness, one intervention strategy is to decrease the 
implicit bias itself.  It would be delightful if explicit refutation would suffice.  But 
abstract, global self-commands to “Be fair!” do not much change implicit social 
cognitions.  How then might we alter implicit attitudes or stereotypes about vari-
ous social groups?193  One potentially effective strategy is to expose ourselves to 
countertypical associations.  In rough terms, if we have a negative attitude toward 
some group, we need exposure to members of that group to whom we would have 
a positive attitude.  If we have a particular stereotype about some group, we need 
exposure to members of that group that do not feature those particular attributes. 
  
192. In a 1999 survey by the National Center for State Courts, 47 percent of the American people 
doubted that African Americans and Latinos receive equal treatment in state courts; 55 percent doubted 
that non–English speaking people receive equal treatment.  The appearance of fairness is a serious 
problem.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: 
A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 37 (1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ 
Res_AmtPTC_PublicViewCrtsPub.pdf.  The term “cosmetic compliance” comes from Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
193. For analysis of the nature versus nurture debate regarding implicit biases, see Jerry Kang, Bits of Bias, 
in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 132 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). 
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These exposures can come through direct contact with countertypical people.  
For example, Nilanjana Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari tracked the implicit gender 
stereotypes held by female subjects both before and after a year of attending 
college.194  One group of women attended a year of coed college; the other group 
attended a single-sex college.  At the start of their college careers, the two groups had 
comparable amounts of implicit stereotypes against women.  However, one year 
later, those who attended the women’s college on average expressed no gender 
bias, whereas the average bias of those who attended the coed school increased.195  
By carefully examining differences in the two universities’ environments, the 
researchers learned that it was exposure to countertypical women in the role of 
professors and university administrators that altered the implicit gender stere-
otypes of female college students.196   
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Luis Rivera also found correlations between partic-
ipants’ self-reported numbers of gay friends and their negative implicit attitudes 
toward gays.197  Such evidence gives further reason to encourage intergroup social 
contact by diversifying the bench, the courtroom (staff and law clerks), our 
residential neighborhoods, and friendship circles.  That said, any serious diversi-
fication of the bench, the bar, and staff would take enormous resources, both 
economic and political.  Moreover, these interventions might produce only modest 
results.  For instance, Rachlinski et al. found that judges from an eastern district that 
featured approximately half White judges and half Black judges had “only slightly 
smaller” implicit biases than the judges of a western jurisdiction, which contained 
only two Black judges (out of forty-five total district court judges, thirty-six of them 
being White).198  In addition, debiasing exposures would have to compete against the 
other daily real-life exposures in the courtroom that rebias.  For instance, Joshua 
Correll found that police officers who worked in areas with high minority 
demographics and violent crime showed more shooter bias.199 
If increasing direct contact with a diverse but countertypical population is 
not readily feasible, what about vicarious contact, which is mediated by images, 
  
194. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic Women 
Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 642, 649–54 (2004). 
195. See id. at 651. 
196. See id. at 651–53. 
197. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to Behavior: The 
Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 268, 270 (2006). 
198. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1227. 
199. See Correll et al., supra note 51, at 1014 (“We tentatively suggest that these environments may 
reinforce cultural stereotypes, linking Black people to the concept of violence.”). 
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videos, simulations, or even imagination and which does not require direct face-
to-face contact?200  Actually, the earliest studies on the malleability of implicit 
bias pursued just these strategies.  For instance, Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony 
Greenwald showed that participants who were exposed vicariously to countertypical 
exemplars in a history questionnaire (for example, Black figures to whom we 
tend to have positive attitudes, such as Martin Luther King Jr., and White figures to 
whom we tend to have negative attitudes, such as Charles Manson) showed a 
substantial decrease in negative implicit attitudes toward African Americans.201  These 
findings are consistent with work done by Irene Blair, who has demonstrated that 
brief mental visualization exercises can also change scores on the IAT.202 
In addition to exposing people to famous countertypical exemplars, implicit 
biases may be decreased by juxtaposing ordinary people with countertypical settings.  
For instance, Bernard Wittenbrink, Charles Judd, and Bernadette Park examined 
the effects of watching videos of African Americans situated either at a convivial 
outdoor barbecue or at a gang-related incident.203  Situating African Americans in 
a positive setting produced lower implicit bias scores.204 
There are, to be sure, questions about whether this evidence directly trans-
lates into possible improvements for the courtroom.205  But even granting numerous 
caveats, might it not be valuable to engage in some experimentation?  In chambers 
and the courtroom buildings, photographs, posters, screen savers, pamphlets, and 
decorations ought to be used that bring to mind countertypical exemplars or associ-
ations for participants in the trial process.  Since judges and jurors are differently 
situated, we can expect both different effects and implementation strategies.  
For example, judges would be exposed to such vicarious displays regularly as a 
feature of their workplace environment.  By contrast, jurors would be exposed only 
  
200. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1166–67 (2000) (comparing vicarious with 
direct experiences). 
201. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating 
Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 800, 807 (2001).  The IAT effect changed nearly 50 percent as compared to the control 
(IAT effect M=78ms versus 174ms, p=0.01) and remained for over twenty-four hours. 
202. Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of 
Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828 (2001).  See 
generally Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002) (literature review). 
203. See Bernd Wittenbrink et al.,  Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated 
Attitudes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815, 818–19 (2001). 
204. Id. at 819. 
205. How long does the intervention last?  How immediate does it have to be?  How much were the 
studies able to ensure focus on the positive countertypical stimulus as opposed to in a courtroom 
where these positives would be amidst the myriad distractions of trial? 
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during their typically brief visit to the court.206  Especially for jurors, then, the 
goal is not anything as ambitious as fundamentally changing the underlying 
structure of their mental associations.  Instead, the hope would be that by reminding 
them of countertypical associations, we might momentarily activate different mental 
patterns while in the courthouse and reduce the impact of implicit biases on 
their decisionmaking.207 
To repeat, we recognize the limitations of our recommendation.  Recent 
research has found much smaller debiasing effects from vicarious exposure than 
originally estimated.208  Moreover, such exposures must compete against the flood 
of typical, schema-consistent exposures we are bombarded with from mass media.  
That said, we see little costs to these strategies even if they appear cosmetic.  There 
is no evidence, for example, that these exposures will be so powerful that they will 
overcorrect and produce net bias against Whites. 
B. Break the Link Between Bias and Behavior 
Even if we cannot remove the bias, perhaps we can alter decisionmaking 
processes so that these biases are less likely to translate into behavior.  In order to 
keep this Article’s scope manageable, we focus on the two key players in the 
courtroom: judges and jurors.209 
1. Judges 
a. Doubt One’s Objectivity 
Most judges view themselves as objective and especially talented at fair 
decisionmaking.  For instance, Rachlinski et al. found in one survey that 97 
percent of judges (thirty-five out of thirty-six) believed that they were in the top 
quartile in “avoid[ing] racial prejudice in decisionmaking”210 relative to other 
judges attending the same conference.  That is, obviously, mathematically impossible.  
  
206. See Kang, supra note 46, at 1537 (raising the possibility of “debiasing booths” in lobbies for waiting jurors). 
207. Rajees Sritharan & Bertram Gawronski, Changing Implicit and Explicit Prejudice: Insights From the 
Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 118 (2010). 
208. See Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial 
Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 141 (2010) (finding an effect size that was approximately 70 
percent smaller than the original Dasgupta and Greenwald findings, see supra note 201). 
209. Other important players obviously include staff, lawyers, and police.  For a discussion of the training 
literature on the police and shooter bias, see Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and 
the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1, 46–48 (2010). 
210. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1225. 
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(One is reminded of Lake Wobegon, where all of the children are above 
average.)  In another survey, 97.2 percent of those administrative agency judges 
surveyed put themselves in the top half in terms of avoiding bias, again impossi-
ble.211  Unfortunately, there is evidence that believing ourselves to be objective puts 
us at particular risk for behaving in ways that belie our self-conception. 
Eric Uhlmann and Geoffrey Cohen have demonstrated that when a person 
believes himself to be objective, such belief licenses him to act on his biases.  In 
one study, they had participants choose either the candidate profile labeled “Gary” 
or the candidate profile labeled “Lisa” for the job of factory manager.  Both candidate 
profiles, comparable on all traits, unambiguously showed strong organization 
skills but weak interpersonal skills.212  Half the participants were primed to view 
themselves as objective.213  The other half were left alone as control. 
Those in the control condition gave the male and female candidates statistically 
indistinguishable hiring evaluations.214  But those who were manipulated to think 
of themselves as objective evaluated the male candidate higher (M=5.06 versus 
3.75, p=0.039, d=0.76).215  Interestingly, this was not due to a malleability of merit 
effect, in which the participants reweighted the importance of either organiza-
tional skills or interpersonal skills in order to favor the man.  Instead, the discrim-
ination was caused by straight-out disparate evaluation, in which the Gary profile was 
rated as more interpersonally skilled than the Lisa profile by those primed to think 
themselves objective (M=3.12 versus 1.94, p=0.023, d=0.86).216  In short, thinking 
oneself to be objective seems ironically to lead one to be less objective and more 
susceptible to biases.  Judges should therefore remind themselves that they are 
human and fallible, notwithstanding their status, their education, and the robe. 
But is such a suggestion based on wishful thinking?  Is there any evidence 
that education and reminders can actually help?  There is some suggestive evi-
dence from Emily Pronin, who has carefully studied the bias blindspot—the belief 
  
211. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical 
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009). 
212. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of Self-Perceived 
Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
207, 210–11 (2007). 
213. This was done simply by asking participants to rate their own objectivity.  Over 88 percent of the partic-
ipants rated themselves as above average on objectivity.  See id. at 209.  The participants were drawn 
from a lay sample (not just college students). 
214. See id. at 210–11 (M=3.24 for male candidate versus 4.05 for female candidate, p=0.21). 
215. See id. at 211. 
216. See id.  Interestingly, the gender of the participants mattered.  Female participants did not show the 
objectivity priming effect.  See id. 
1174 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012) 
 
   
that others are biased but we ourselves are not.217  In one study, Emily Pronin and 
Matthew Kugler had a control group of Princeton students read an article from 
Nature about environmental pollution.  By contrast, the treatment group read an 
article allegedly published in Science that described various nonconscious influ-
ences on attitudes and behaviors.218  After reading an article, the participants were 
asked about their own objectivity as compared to their university peers.  Those in 
the control group revealed the predictable bias blindspot and thought that they 
suffered from less bias than their peers.219  By contrast, those in the treatment group 
did not believe that they were more objective than their peers; moreover, their 
more modest self-assessments differed from those of the more confident control 
group.220  These results suggest that learning about nonconscious thought processes 
can lead people to be more skeptical about their own objectivity. 
b. Increase Motivation 
Tightly connected to doubting one’s objectivity is the strategy of increasing 
one’s motivation to be fair.221  Social psychologists generally agree that motivation 
is an important determinant of checking biased behavior.222  Specific to implicit bias, 
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Luis Rivera found that participants who were consciously 
motivated to be egalitarian did not allow their antigay implicit attitudes to 
translate into biased behavior toward a gay person.  By contrast, for those lacking 
such motivation, strong antigay implicit attitudes predicted more biased behavior.223 
A powerful way to increase judicial motivation is for judges to gain actual 
scientific knowledge about implicit social cognitions.  In other words, judges 
should be internally persuaded that a genuine problem exists.  This education and 
  
217. See generally Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2007). 
218. See Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Introspection 
Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 574 (2007).  The 
intervention article was 1643 words long, excluding references.  See id. at 575.  
219. See id. at 575 (M=5.29 where 6 represented the same amount of bias as peers). 
220. See id.  For the treatment group, their self-evaluation of objectivity was M=5.88, not statistically 
significantly different from the score of 6, which, as noted previously, meant having the same amount 
of bias as peers.  Also, the self-reported objectivity of the treatment group (M=5.88) differed from the 
control group (M=5.29) in a statistically significant way, p=0.01.  See id.  
221. For a review, see Margo J. Monteith et al., Schooling the Cognitive Monster: The Role of Motivation in 
the Regulation and Control of Prejudice, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 211 (2009). 
222. See Russell H. Fazio & Tamara Towles-Schwen, The MODE Model of Attitude–Behavior Processes, 
in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 97 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope 
eds., 1999). 
223. See Dasgupta & Rivera, supra note 197, at 275. 
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awareness can be done through self-study as well as more official judicial educa-
tion.  Such education is already taking place, although mostly in an ad hoc fashion.224  
The most organized intervention has come through the National Center for State 
Courts (NCSC).  The NCSC organized a three-state pilot project in California, 
Minnesota, and North Dakota to teach judges and court staff about implicit bias.225  
It used a combination of written materials, videos, resource websites, Implicit 
Association Tests, and online lectures from subject-matter experts to provide the 
knowledge.  Questionnaires completed before and after each educational interven-
tion provided an indication of program effectiveness. 
Although increased knowledge of the underlying science is a basic objective of 
an implicit bias program, the goal is not to send judges back to college for a crash 
course in Implicit Psychology 101.  Rather, it is to persuade judges, on the merits, to 
recognize implicit bias as a potential problem, which in turn should increase moti-
vation to adopt sensible countermeasures.  Did the NCSC projects increase 
recognition of the problem and encourage the right sorts of behavioral changes?  The 
only evidence we have is limited: voluntary self-reports subject to obvious selec-
tion biases.  
For example, in California, judicial training emphasized a documentary on the 
neuroscience of bias.226  Before and after watching the documentary, participants 
were asked to what extent they thought “a judge’s decisions and court staff’s interac-
tion with the public can be unwittingly influenced by unconscious bias toward 
racial/ethnic groups.”227  Before viewing the documentary, approximately 16 percent 
chose “rarely-never,” 55 percent chose “occasionally,” and 30 percent chose “most-
all.”  After viewing the documentary, 1 percent chose “rarely-never,” 20 percent 
chose “occasionally,” and 79 percent chose “most-all.”228 
Relatedly, participants were asked whether they thought implicit bias could 
have an impact on behavior even if a person lacked explicit bias.  Before viewing 
the documentary, approximately 9 percent chose “rarely-never,” 45 percent chose 
“occasionally,” and 45 percent chose “most-all.”  After viewing the documentary, 
1 percent chose “rarely-never,” 14 percent chose “occasionally,” and 84 percent 
  
224. Several of the authors of this Article have spoken to judges on the topic of implicit bias. 
225. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS 
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012), available at http://www.ncsc.org/IBReport. 
226. The program was broadcast on the Judicial Branch’s cable TV station and made available streaming 
on the Internet.  See The Neuroscience and Psychology of Decisionmaking, ADMIN. OFF. COURTS EDUC. 
DIV. (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/cjer/aoctv/dialogue/neuro/index.htm.   
227. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 225, at 12 fig.2. 
228. See id. 
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chose “most-all.”229  These statistics provide some evidence that the California docu-
mentary increased awareness of the problem of implicit bias.  The qualitative data, 
in the form of write-in comments230 support this interpretation. 
What about the adoption of behavioral countermeasures?  Because no specific 
reforms were recommended at the time of training, there was no attempt to meas-
ure behavioral changes.  All that we have are self-reports that speak to the issue.  For 
instance, participants were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, “I will apply 
the course content to my work.”  In California, 90 percent (N=60) reported that they 
agreed or strongly agreed.231  In North Dakota (N=32), 97 percent reported that 
they agreed or strongly agreed.232  Three months later, there was a follow-up survey 
given to the North Dakota participants, but only fourteen participants replied.  In 
that survey, 77 percent of those who responded stated that they had made 
efforts to reduce the potential impact of implicit bias.233  In sum, the findings across 
all three pilot programs suggest that education programs can increase motivation 
and encourage judges to engage in some behavioral modifications.  Given the lim-
itations of the data (for example, pilot projects with small numbers of partic-
ipants, self-reports, self-selection, and limited follow-up results), additional research 
is needed to confirm these promising but preliminary results. 
From our collective experience, we also recommend the following tactics.  
First, training should commence early, starting with new-judge orientation when 
individuals are likely to be most receptive.  Second, training should not immediately 
put judges on the defensive, for instance, by accusing them of concealing explicit 
bias.  Instead, trainers can start the conversation with other types of decisionmaking 
errors and cognitive biases, such as anchoring, or less-threatening biases, such 
as the widespread preference for the youth over the elderly that IATs reveal.  
Third, judges should be encouraged to take the IAT or other measures of implicit 
  
229. Id. at 12 fig.3. 
230. Comments included: “raising my awareness of prevalence of implicit bias,” “enlightened me on the 
penetration of implicit bias in everyday life, even though I consciously strive to be unbiased and 
assume most people try to do the same,” and “greater awareness—I really appreciated the impressive 
panel of participants; I really learned a lot, am very interested.”  See CASEY ET AL., supra note 225, at 11. 
231. See id. at 10. 
232. See id. at 18.  Minnesota answered a slightly different question: 81 percent gave the program’s 
applicability a medium high to high rating. 
233. See id. at 20.  The strategies that were identified included: “concerted effort to be aware of bias,” “I 
more carefully review my reasons for decisions, likes, dislikes, and ask myself if there may be bias 
underlying my determination,” “Simply trying to think things through more thoroughly,” 
“Reading and learning more about other cultures,” and “I have made mental notes to myself on the 
bench to be more aware of the implicit bias and I’ve re-examined my feelings to see if it is because of 
the party and his/her actions vs. any implicit bias on my part.” 
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bias.  Numerous personal accounts have reported how the discomfiting act of 
taking the IAT alone motivates action.  And researchers are currently studying the 
specific behavioral and social cognitive changes that take place through such self-
discovery.  That said, we do not recommend that such tests be mandatory because 
the feeling of resentment and coercion is likely to counter the benefits of increased 
self-knowledge.  Moreover, judges should never be expected to disclose their 
personal results.  
c. Improve Conditions of Decisionmaking 
Implicit biases function automatically.  One way to counter them is to engage 
in effortful, deliberative processing.234  But when decisionmakers are short on time 
or under cognitive load, they lack the resources necessary to engage in such delib-
eration.  Accordingly, we encourage judges to take special care when they must 
respond quickly and to try to avoid making snap judgments whenever possible.  We 
recognize that judges are under enormous pressures to clear ever-growing dockets.  
That said, it is precisely under such work conditions that judges need to be especially 
on guard against their biases. 
There is also evidence that certain elevated emotional states, either positive 
or negative, can prompt more biased decisionmaking.  For example, a state of 
happiness seems to increase stereotypic thinking,235 which can be countered when 
individuals are held accountable for their judgments.  Of greater concern might be 
feelings of anger, disgust, or resentment toward certain social categories.  If the 
emotion is consistent with the stereotypes or anticipated threats associated with that 
social category, then those negative emotions are likely to exacerbate implicit biases.236 
  
234. There are also ways to deploy more automatic countermeasures.  In other words, one can teach one’s 
mind to respond not reflectively but reflexively, by automatically triggering goal-directed behavior 
through internalization of certain if-then responses.  These countermeasures function implicitly and 
even under conditions of cognitive load.  See generally Saaid A. Mendoza et al., Reducing the Expression 
of Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control Through Implementation Intentions, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 512, 514–15, 520 (2010); Monteith et al., supra note 221, at 218–21 (discussing 
bottom-up correction versus top-down). 
235. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 621 (1994). 
236. See Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence of Specific Incidental 
Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585 (2009).  The researchers found that implicit bias against 
gays and lesbians could be increased more by making participants feel disgust than by making partic-
ipants feel anger.  See id. at 588.  Conversely, they found that implicit bias against Arabs could be 
increased more by making participants feel angry rather than disgusted.  See id. at 589; see also David 
DeSteno et al., Prejudice From Thin Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes, 15 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 319 (2004). 
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In sum, judges should try to achieve the conditions of decisionmaking that allow 
them to be mindful and deliberative and thus avoid huge emotional swings.   
d. Count 
Finally, we encourage judges and judicial institutions to count.  Increasing 
accountability has been shown to decrease the influence of bias and thus has fre-
quently been offered as a mechanism for reducing bias.  But, how can the behavior 
of trial court judges be held accountable if biased decisionmaking is itself 
difficult to detect?  If judges do not seek out the information that could help them 
see their own potential biases, those biases become more difficult to correct.  Just 
as trying to lose or gain weight without a scale is challenging, judges should 
engage in more quantified self-analysis and seek out and assess patterns of behavior 
that cannot be recognized in single decisions.  Judges need to count. 
The comparison we want to draw is with professional umpires and referees.  
Statistical analyses by behavioral economists have discovered various biases, including 
ingroup racial biases, in the decisionmaking of professional sports judges.  Joseph 
Price and Justin Wolfers found racial ingroup biases in National Basketball 
Association (NBA) referees’ foul calling;237 Christopher Parsons and colleagues 
found ingroup racial bias in Major League Baseball (MLB) umpires’ strike calling.238  
These discoveries were only possible because professional sports leagues count 
performance, including referee performance, in a remarkably granular and compre-
hensive manner. 
Although NBA referees and MLB umpires make more instantaneous calls 
than judges, judges do regularly make quick judgments on motions, objections, 
and the like.  In these contexts, judges often cannot slow down.  So, it makes sense 
  
237. Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1859, 
1885 (2010) (“We find that players have up to 4% fewer fouls called against them and score up to 
2½% more points on nights in which their race matches that of the refereeing crew.  Player statistics 
that one might think are unaffected by referee behavior [for example, free throw shooting] are uncorre-
lated with referee race.  The bias in foul-calling is large enough so that the probability of a team 
winning is noticeably affected by the racial composition of the refereeing crew assigned to the game.”). 
238. Christopher A. Parsons et al., Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1410, 1433 (2011) (“Pitches are slightly more likely to be called strikes when the umpire shares 
the race/ethnicity of the starting pitcher, an effect that is observable only when umpires’ behavior is 
not well monitored.  The evidence also suggests that this bias has substantial effects on pitchers’ 
measured performance and games’ outcomes.  The link between the small and large effects arises, 
at least in part, because pitchers alter their behavior in potentially discriminatory situations in ways that 
ordinarily would disadvantage themselves (such as throwing pitches directly over the plate).”). 
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to count their performances in domains such as bail, probable cause, and 
preliminary hearings.  
We recognize that such counting may be difficult for individual judges who 
lack both the quantitative training and the resources to track their own perfor-
mance statistics.  That said, even amateur, basic counting, with data collection meth-
ods never intended to make it into a peer-reviewed journal, might reveal surprising 
outcomes.  Of course, the most useful information will require an institutional 
commitment to counting across multiple judges and will make use of appro-
priately sophisticated methodologies.  The basic objective is to create a negative 
feedback loop in which individual judges and the judiciary writ large are given 
the corrective information necessary to know how they are doing and to be 
motivated to make changes if they find evidence of biased performances.  It may be 
difficult to correct biases even when we do know about them, but it is virtually 
impossible to correct them if they remain invisible. 
2. Jurors 
a. Jury Selection and Composition 
Individual screen.  One obvious way to break the link between bias and 
unfair decisions is to keep biased persons off the jury.  Since everyone has implicit 
biases of one sort or another, the more precise goal would be to screen out those 
with excessively high biases that are relevant to the case at hand.  This is, of course, 
precisely one of the purposes of voir dire, although the interrogation process was 
designed to ferret out concealed explicit bias, not implicit bias. 
One might reasonably ask whether potential jurors should be individu-
ally screened for implicit bias via some instrument such as the IAT.  But the leading 
scientists in implicit social cognition recommend against using the test as an individu-
ally diagnostic measure.  One reason is that although the IAT has enough test-
retest reliability to provide useful research information about human beings 
generally, its reliability is sometimes below what we would like for individual 
assessments.239  Moreover, real-word diagnosticity for individuals raises many more 
issues than just test-retest reliability.  Finally, those with implicit biases need not 
  
239. The test-retest reliability between a person’s IAT scores at two different times has been found to be 
0.50.  For further discussion, see Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 477–78.  Readers should understand 
that “the IAT’s properties approximately resemble those of sphygmomanometer blood pressure (BP) 
measures that are used to assess hypertension.”  See Anthony G. Greenwald & N. Sriram, No Measure 
Is Perfect, but Some Measures Can Be Quite Useful: Response to Two Comments on the Brief Implicit 
Association Test, 57 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 238, 240 (2010). 
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be regarded as incapable of breaking the causal chain from implicit bias to 
judgment.  Accordingly, we maintain this scientifically conservative approach and 
recommend against using the IAT for individual juror selection.240 
Jury diversity.  Consider what a White juror wrote to Judge Janet Bond Arterton 
about jury deliberations during a civil rights complaint filed by Black plaintiffs: 
During deliberations, matter-of-fact expressions of bigotry and broad-
brush platitudes about “those people” rolled off the tongues of a vocal 
majority as naturally and unabashedly as if they were discussing the 
weather.  Shocked and sickened, I sat silently, rationalizing to myself that 
since I did agree with the product, there was nothing to be gained by 
speaking out against the process (I now regret my inaction).  Had just 
one African-American been sitting in that room, the content of discussion 
would have been quite different.  And had the case been more balanced—
one that hinged on fine distinction or subtle nuances—a more diverse 
jury might have made a material difference in the outcome.   
I pass these thoughts onto you in the hope that the jury system can 
some day be improved.241 
This anecdote suggests that a second-best strategy to striking potential jurors with 
high implicit bias is to increase the demographic diversity of juries242 to get a 
broader distribution of biases, some of which might cancel each other out.  This 
is akin to a diversification strategy for an investment portfolio.  Moreover, in a more 
diverse jury, people’s willingness to express explicit biases might be muted, and the 
very existence of diversity might even affect the operation of implicit biases as well. 
In support of this approach, Sam Sommers has confirmed that racial diversity 
in the jury alters deliberations.  In a mock jury experiment, he compared the delib-
eration content of all-White juries with that of racially diverse juries.243  Racially 
diverse juries processed information in a way that most judges and lawyers would 
consider desirable: They had longer deliberations, greater focus on the actual evi-
dence, greater discussion of missing evidence, fewer inaccurate statements, fewer 
  
240. For legal commentary in agreement, see, for example, Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection 
and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 856–57 (2012).  Roberts suggests using 
the IAT during orientation as an educational tool for jurors instead.  Id. at 863–66. 
241. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2008) 
(quoting letter from anonymous juror) (emphasis added). 
242. For a structural analysis of why juries lack racial diversity, see Samuel R. Sommers, Determinants and 
Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity: Empirical Findings, Implications, and Directions for Future Research, 
2 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 65, 68–71 (2008). 
243. The juries labeled “diverse” featured four White and two Black jurors. 
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uncorrected statements, and greater discussion of race-related topics.244  In addi-
tion to these information-based benefits, Sommers found interesting 
predeliberation effects: Simply by knowing that they would be serving on diverse 
juries (as compared to all-White ones), White jurors were less likely to believe, at 
the conclusion of evidence but before deliberations, that the Black defendant 
was guilty.245 
Given these benefits,246 we are skeptical about peremptory challenges, which 
private parties deploy to decrease racial diversity in precisely those cases in 
which diversity is likely to matter most.247  Accordingly, we agree with the recom-
mendation by various commentators, including Judge Mark Bennett, to curtail 
substantially the use of peremptory challenges.248  In addition, we encourage consid-
eration of restoring a 12-member jury size as “the most effective approach” to 
maintain juror representativeness.249 
b. Jury Education About Implicit Bias 
In our discussion of judge bias, we recommended that judges become skep-
tical of their own objectivity and learn about implicit social cognition to become 
motivated to check against implicit bias.  The same principle applies to jurors, who 
must be educated and instructed to do the same in the course of their jury 
service.  This education should take place early and often.  For example, Judge 
  
244. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of 
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006). 
245. See Sommers, supra note 242, at 87. 
246. Other benefits include promoting public confidence in the judicial system.  See id. at 82–88 (summarizing 
theoretical and empirical literature). 
247. See Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers & Sara Brauner, Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying 
Prohibited Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 467 (2007); Samuel R. 
Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection: Psychological Perspectives on the Peremptory 
Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527 (2008) (reviewing literature); Samuel R. Sommers & 
Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of 
Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007) (finding 
that race influences the exercise of peremptory challenges in participant populations that include 
college students, law students, and practicing attorneys and that participants effectively justified their 
use of challenges in race-neutral terms). 
248. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 85, at 168–69 (recommending the tandem solution of increased lawyer 
participation in voir dire and the banning of peremptory challenges); Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-
Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).  
249. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 
6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 427 (2009). 
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Bennett spends approximately twenty-five minutes discussing implicit bias during 
jury selection.250  
At the conclusion of jury selection, Judge Bennett asks each potential juror 




I will not decide this case based on biases.  This includes gut 
feelings, prejudices, stereotypes, personal likes or dislikes, sympathies 
or generalizations.251 
He also gives a specific jury instruction on implicit biases before opening 
statements: 
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.”  As we discussed in 
jury selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions, percep-
tions, fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we may not 
be aware of.  These hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear, 
how we remember what we see and hear, and how we make important 
decisions.  Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I 
strongly encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist 
jumping to conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes, generaliza-
tions, gut feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases.  The law 
demands that you return a just verdict, based solely on the evidence, 
your individual evaluation of that evidence, your reason and common 
  
250. Judge Bennett starts with a clip from What Would You Do?, an ABC show that uses hidden cameras 
to capture bystanders’ reactions to a variety of staged situations.  This episode—a brilliant demonstration 
of bias—opens with a bike chained to a pole near a popular bike trail on a sunny afternoon.  First, a 
young White man, dressed in jeans, a t-shirt, and a baseball cap, approaches the bike with a 
hammer and saw and begins working on the chain (and even gets to the point of pulling out an 
industrial-strength bolt cutter).  Many people pass by without saying anything; one asks him if he 
lost the key to his bike lock.  Although many others show concern, they do not interfere.  After those 
passersby clear, the show stages its next scenario: a young Black man, dressed the same way, 
approaches the bike with the same tools and attempts to break the chain.  Within seconds, people confront 
him, wanting to know whether the bike is his.  Quickly, a crowd congregates, with people shouting at him 
that he cannot take what does not belong to him and some even calling the police.  Finally, after the 
crowd moves on, the show stages its last scenario: a young White woman, attractive and scantily clad, 
approaches the bike with the same tools and attempts to saw through the chain.  Several men ride 
up and ask if they can help her break the lock!  Potential jurors immediately see how implicit biases 
can affect what they see and hear.  What Would You Do? (ABC television broadcast May 7, 2010), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge7i60GuNRg. 
251. Mark W. Bennett, Jury Pledge Against Implicit Bias (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors).  In addition, Judge Bennett has a framed poster prominently displayed in the jury room that 
repeats the language in the pledge. 
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sense, and these instructions.  Our system of justice is counting on you 
to render a fair decision based on the evidence, not on biases.252 
Juror research suggests that jurors respond differently to instructions 
depending on the persuasiveness of each instruction’s rationale.  For example, jurors 
seem to comply more with an instruction to ignore inadmissible evidence when 
the reason for inadmissibility is potential unreliability, not procedural irregu-
larity.253  Accordingly, the implicit bias instructions to jurors should be couched in 
accurate, evidence-based, and scientific terms.  As with the judges, the juror’s 
education and instruction should not put them on the defensive, which might 
make them less receptive.  Notice how Judge Bennett’s instruction emphasizes the 
near universality of implicit biases, including in the judge himself, which decreases 
the likelihood of insult, resentment, or backlash from the jurors. 
To date, no empirical investigation has tested a system like Judge 
Bennett’s—although we believe there are good reasons to hypothesize about its 
benefits.  For instance, Regina Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas, and Kerry Kawakami 
demonstrated that a particular type of reflective voir dire, which required indi-
viduals to answer an open-ended question about the possibility of racial bias, 
  
252. Id.  In all criminal cases, Judge Bennett also instructs on explicit biases using an instruction that is 
borrowed from a statutory requirement in federal death penalty cases:  
You must follow certain rules while conducting your deliberations and returning 
your verdict: 
* * * 
Reach your verdict without discrimination.  In reaching your verdict, you must not 
consider the defendant’s race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex.  You are 
not to return a verdict for or against the defendant unless you would return the same 
verdict without regard to his race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex.  To 
emphasize the importance of this requirement, the verdict form contains a certifi-
cation statement.  Each of you should carefully read that statement, then sign your 
name in the appropriate place in the signature block, if the statement accurately reflects 
how you reached your verdict. 
The certification statement, contained in a final section labeled “Certification” on the Verdict 
Form, states the following: 
By signing below, each juror certifies that consideration of the race, color, religious 
beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant was not involved in reaching his or her 
individual decision, and that the individual juror would have returned the same 
verdict for or against the defendant on the charged offense regardless of the race, color, 
religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant. 
This certification is also shown to all potential jurors in jury selection, and each is asked if they will 
be able to sign it. 
253. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and 
the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1046 (1997) (finding evidence that mock jurors responded differently to wiretap evidence that was ruled 
inadmissible either because it was illegally obtained or unreliable). 
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appeared successful at removing juror racial bias in assessments of guilt.254  That 
said, no experiment has yet been done on whether jury instructions specifically 
targeted at implicit bias are effective in real-world settings.  Research on this spe-
cific question is in development. 
We also recognize the possibility that such instructions could lead to juror 
complacency or moral credentialing, in which jurors believe themselves to be prop-
erly immunized or educated about bias and thus think themselves to be more objec-
tive than they really are.  And, as we have learned, believing oneself to be objective 
is a prime threat to objectivity.  Despite these limitations, we believe that implicit 
bias education and instruction of the jury is likely to do more good than harm, 
though we look forward to further research that can help us assess this hypothesis. 
c. Encourage Category-Conscious Strategies 
Foreground social categories.  Many jurors reasonably believe that in order to 
be fair, they should be as colorblind (or gender-blind, and so forth.) as possible.  
In other words, they should try to avoid seeing race, thinking about race, or 
talking about race whenever possible.  But the juror research by Sam Sommers 
demonstrated that White jurors showed race bias in adjudicating the merits of a 
battery case (between White and Black people) unless they perceived the case to 
be somehow racially charged.  In other words, until and unless White jurors felt 
there was a specific threat to racial fairness, they showed racial bias.255 
What this seems to suggest is that whenever a social category bias might be 
at issue, judges should recommend that jurors feel free to expressly raise and 
foreground any such biases in their discussions.  Instead of thinking it appropriate 
to repress race, gender, or sexual orientation as irrelevant to understanding the 
case, judges should make jurors comfortable with the legitimacy of raising such 
issues.  This may produce greater confrontation among the jurors within deliberation, 
and evidence suggests that it is precisely this greater degree of discussion, and even 
confrontation, that can potentially decrease the amount of biased decisionmaking.256 
This recommendation—to be conscious of race, gender, and other social 
categories—may seem to contradict some of the jury instructions that we noted 
  
254. Regina A. Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas & Kerry Kawakami, The Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures 
on Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 320 (2009). 
255. See supra notes 70–71. 
256. See Alexander M. Czopp, Margo J. Monteith & Aimee Y. Mark, Standing Up for a Change: Reducing 
Bias Through Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784, 791 (2006). 
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above approvingly.257  But a command that the race (and other social categories) 
of the defendant should not influence the juror’s verdict is entirely consistent with 
instructions to recognize explicitly that race can have just this impact—unless 
countermeasures are taken.  In other words, in order to make jurors behave in a 
colorblind manner, we can explicitly foreground the possibility of racial bias.258 
Engage in perspective shifting.  Another strategy is to recommend that jurors 
try shifting perspectives into the position of the outgroup party, either plaintiff 
or defendant.259  Andrew Todd, Galen Bohenhausen, Jennifer Richardson, and 
Adam Galinsky have recently demonstrated that actively contemplating others’ 
psychological experiences weakens the automatic expression of racial biases.260  In 
a series of experiments, the researchers used various interventions to make partic-
ipants engage in more perspective shifting.  For instance, in one experiment, before 
seeing a five-minute video of a Black man being treated worse than an identically 
situated White man, participants were asked to imagine “what they might be 
thinking, feeling, and experiencing if they were Glen [the Black man], looking 
at the world through his eyes and walking in his shoes as he goes through the 
various activities depicted in the documentary.”261  By contrast, the control group 
was told to remain objective and emotionally detached.  In other variations, perspec-
tive taking was triggered by requiring participants to write an essay imagining a 
day in the life of a young Black male. 
These perspective-taking interventions substantially decreased implicit bias in 
the form of negative attitudes, as measured by both a variant of the standard 
IAT (the personalized IAT) and the standard race attitude IAT.262  More impor-
tant, these changes in implicit bias, as measured by reaction time instruments, 
  
257. See Bennett, supra note 252 (“[Y]ou must not consider the defendant’s race, color, religious beliefs, 
national origin, or sex.  You are not to return a verdict for or against the defendant unless you would 
return the same verdict without regard to his race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex.”). 
258. Although said in a different context, Justice Blackmun’s insight seems appropriate here: “In order to 
get beyond racism we must first take account of race.”  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
259. For a thoughtful discussion of jury instructions on “gender-, race-, and/or sexual orientation-switching,” 
see CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE 
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 252–55 (2003); see also id. at 257–58 (quoting actual race-switching 
instruction given in a criminal trial based on Prof. Lee’s work). 
260. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027 (2011). 
261. See id. at 1030. 
262. Experiment one involved the five-minute video.  Those in the perspective-shifting condition showed 
a bias of M=0.43, whereas those in the control showed a bias of M=0.80.  Experiment two involved 
the essay, in which participants in the perspective-taking condition showed M=0.01 versus M=0.49.  
See id. at 1031.  Experiment three used the standard IAT.  See id. at 1033. 
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also correlated with behavioral changes.  For example, the researchers found that 
those in the perspective-taking condition chose to sit closer to a Black 
interviewer,263 and physical closeness has long been understood as positive body 
language, which is reciprocated.  Moreover, Black experimenters rated their 
interaction with White participants who were put in the perspective-taking 
condition more positively.264 
CONCLUSION 
Most of us would like to be free of biases, attitudes, and stereotypes that lead 
us to judge individuals based on the social categories they belong to, such as race 
and gender.  But wishing things does not make them so.  And the best scientific evi-
dence suggests that we—all of us, no matter how hard we try to be fair and square, 
no matter how deeply we believe in our own objectivity—have implicit mental 
associations that will, in some circumstances, alter our behavior.  They manifest 
everywhere, even in the hallowed courtroom.  Indeed, one of our key points here is 
not to single out the courtroom as a place where bias especially reigns but rather to 
suggest that there is no evidence for courtroom exceptionalism.  There is simply 
no legitimate basis for believing that these pervasive implicit biases somehow stop 
operating in the halls of justice. 
Confronted with a robust research basis suggesting the widespread effects of 
bias on decisionmaking, we are therefore forced to choose.  Should we seek to be 
behaviorally realistic, recognize our all-too-human frailties, and design procedures 
and systems to decrease the impact of bias in the courtroom?  Or should we 
ignore inconvenient facts, stick our heads in the sand, and hope they somehow go 
away?  Even with imperfect information and tentative understandings, we choose 
the first option.  We recognize that our suggestions are starting points, that they 
may not all work, and that, even as a whole, they may not be sufficient.  But we 
do think they are worth a try.  We hope that judges and other stakeholders in the 
justice system agree. 
 
  
263. See id. at 1035. 
264. See id. at 1037. 
